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INTRODUCTION 
hortly over a decade ago, two very exciting developments in the 
fields of international law and comparative law (respectively) 
whizzed past one another. The first, in the field of international law, was 
the publication of a now-classic 1999 symposium issue by the American 
Journal of International Law (“AJIL”) where representatives of seven 
different methods or approaches to international law wrote upon a single 
issue using their approach.1 This was meant to illustrate the wealth of 
insights to be gained from various interdisciplinary, critical, or other ap-
proaches to common international law problems.2 In comparative law, an 
event of parallel proportions was the Centennial World Congress of 
Comparative Law, held in New Orleans in 2000 to commemorate the 
opening of the first World Congress on Comparative Law in Paris in 
1900.3 The 2000 New Orleans conference drew leading comparativists 
from the world over to assess the state of the discipline, to examine com-
parative law’s successes and failures in the twentieth century, and to out-
line the most pressing areas for inquiry for the coming years. 
The two symposia could not have shared more disparate fates. The 
AJIL symposium issue, edited by Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, became a bestseller (by standards of American legal scholarship), 
commanding several subsequent reissues from 2004 forward. It remains 
in print, offering a menu of methodologies for internationalists depend-
ing on taste and intellectual or political bend.4 The Ratner/Slaughter 
book has become a desktop reference for students and practitioners eager 
to acquaint themselves with realism in international relations or looking 
for a quick primer on Third World Approaches to International Law 
(“TWAIL”). By contrast, the comparative law symposium issue went, by 
and large, unnoticed outside the discipline. This is regrettable, but not for 
the familiar Cinderella reasons.5 
                                                                                                                                  
 1. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of Interna-
tional Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 293, 295 (1999). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Centennial World Congress on Comparative Law: 
Opening Remarks, 75 TUL. L. REV. 859, 862 (2001). 
 4. Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Method is the Message, in THE 
METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239, 243 (Am. Soc’y Int’l Law, Stud. in Transnat’l 
Legal Pol’y Ser. No. 36, Ratner & Slaughter eds., 2004) [hereinafter Ratner & Slaughter, 
Method in the Message]. 
 5. See generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Compara-
tive Law, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985) (describing how failure to engage in critical 
introspection has relegated comparative law to the status of an underappreciated sibling 
in legal academia). 
S 
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Ten years on, a group of scholars are now undertaking the delicate task 
of weaving together the fields of comparative law and international law. 
Recently, a conference organized by a progressive group of doctoral law 
students (the Toronto Group6) presented a panel exploring the field of 
comparative international law (“CIL”), or national approaches to public 
international law and governance.7 These conferences are indicative of 
surging interest in, and potential misuse of, traditional comparative law 
techniques, vocabularies, and projects. 
In effort to seize on this moment and guide the methodological and 
substantive discussion on CIL towards emancipatory ends, it is vital to 
address three fundamental issues, or what we shall call roots (the history 
of CIL); pitfalls (intellectual traps for the unwary sojourner exploring 
CIL); and politics (or the ineluctable moral, distributive, and participato-
ry consequences of CIL projects). We explore these three issues mindful 
of a constellation of historical factors that have contributed to the rise of 
CIL. Principal among these was the collapse of the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics (“USSR”) twenty years ago and the ostensible elimina-
tion of not only socialist law from the grand family of legal systems, but 
also of socialist international law from the mindset of international law-
yers and practitioners.8 
Section I begins with an examination of the history of CIL, choosing 
the creation of the Soviet Union and the concomitant creation of “Soviet 
international law” as the starting point of our inquiry. This Section ex-
plores the important cross-fertilization between the two disciplines 
(comparative law and international law) during the period. Section II 
analyzes several important methodological paths available to CIL scho-
lars, including focusing on the study of comparative international legal 
histories, CIL institutional histories, and the study of the diffusion of 
norms or dominant ideologies. Section III concludes by exploring the 
implications of such a study and suggests analytical frameworks for 
prospective CIL projects. 
                                                                                                                                  
 6. See Michael Fakhri, Anxieties and Aspirations: A Schematic Note on the Toronto 
Group for the Study of International, Transnational and Comparative Law 1–2 (Compar-
ative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 11/2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1128129. 
 7. See Toronto Group for the Study of Int’l, Transnational, and Comparative Law, 
Call for Papers: Concerning States of Mind, Disturbing the Minds of States (2010), 
available at http://torontogroup.files.wordpress.com/2009/08/toronto-group-2010-call-
for-papers.pdf [hereinafter Toronto Group]; see also Am. Soc’y Int’l Law & Egyptian 
Soc’y Int’l Law, Call for Papers: Are There Regional Approaches to International Law 
and Institutions? (2010), available at http://www.asil.org/files/egypt100620.pdf. 
 8. See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD 
TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 17–28 (3d ed. 1985). 
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I. ROOTS: BRIEF HISTORY OF CIL 
A common misconception in CIL is that this nascent field is the intel-
lectual product of advances in critical approaches to international law, or 
what has elsewhere been called new approaches to international law 
(“NAIL”) or ‘newstream,’9 and more recently still, TWAIL.10 This sen-
timent is heard in any number of conference presentations.11 As a thre-
shold matter, it is factually incorrect. CIL is not the product of the past 
decade. As an academic discipline in the West, the course “comparative 
approaches to international law” was taught in the 1970s at University 
College London by eminent Russian law scholar William E. Butler.12 An 
edited work on international law in comparative perspective was pub-
lished thirty years ago by Butler in 1980.13 Twenty-five years ago, Butler 
also delivered a series of lectures on the field at the Hague Academy of 
International Law.14 His contributions to the methodology of CIL below 
are discussed below. 
Even the term is far from new. Aside from Butler’s use of comparative 
approaches to international law, CIL can be traced to the early 1960s to 
describe the competing Western and Soviet international legal orders.15 
The term was recently suggested for the process of comparing interna-
                                                                                                                                  
 9. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 
2003) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES]. 
 10. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, New Approaches to the History of International Law, 19 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 555, 558–59 (2006); B.S. CHIMNI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD 
ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES (1993). 
 11. See, e.g., Toronto Group, supra note 7 (“In the past decade, many scholars have 
critiqued this tendency, using historical and biographical methods to examine the place of 
subjectivity and situatedness in international law.”). 
 12. W.E. Butler, Acknowledgments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE vii (W.E. Butler ed., 1980) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE]; W.E. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Me-
thod, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12, at 25, 29 
n.17 [hereinafter Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method]. In the late 
1960s, Butler led a study at Harvard Law School in Russian, Chinese, and American 
approaches to international law. See, e.g., W.E. Butler, American Research on Soviet 
Approaches to Public International Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 218, 223–24 (1970) [herei-
nafter Butler, American Research on Soviet Approaches]. 
 13. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 12 (surveying 
application of comparative method to public international law). 
 14. W.E. Butler, Comparative Approaches to International Law, 190 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 9, 58–61 (1985) [hereinafter Butler, Comparative Approaches]. 
 15. 1 THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER: TOWARD A THEORY OF WAR PREVENTION 
227–29 nn.1–11 (Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., 1966). 
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tional treaties and provisions,16 but the more traditional and common-
sense use is the one proposed by McWhinney, Butler, and others to de-
scribe, in very general terms, competing approaches to international law, 
institutions, and governance.17 This is an important clarification, for as 
discussed below, terminological issues are some of the most central 
fields of debate in comparative law. 
Furthermore, as will be explored, CIL also existed earlier as a discip-
line in other national traditions. Below, this Article surveys the origins of 
CIL in the early twentieth century without any claim regarding earlier 
origins of this sub-field.18 In fact, subsequent histories will surely place 
the start of CIL much further in the annals of history (and introduce pa-
rallel CIL traditions in the same temporal plane). But, for the present 
purposes, the chosen periodization is sufficient to illustrate the promises 
and major blindspots inherent in such a study. 
                                                                                                                                  
 16. MARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW 305 
(2001) (uses the term to mean the “comparison of international treaties and their provi-
sions” but this is assuredly not the best use for such a broad term); Anthea Roberts, Com-
parative International Law? The Role of National Courts in Creating and Enforcing In-
ternational Law, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 57 (2011) (using the term “comparative interna-
tional law” to refer to the way academics, practitioners and national courts seek to identi-
fy and interpret international law by engaging in comparative analyses of various domes-
tic court decisions). 
 17. Edward McWhinney used comparative international law to describe not merely 
intra-bloc rivalry over competing international law ‘systems’ during the Cold War, but to 
describe the divergent evolution of other systems of international law, such as: (1) tradi-
tional international law in the sense of custom-based rules and general treaty law; (2) UN 
law, UNSC and UNGA resolutions and decisions of the ICJ; (3) ‘regional’ international 
law; and (4) Socialist international law. See Edward McWhinney, Operational Methodol-
ogy and Philosophy for Accommodation of the Contending International Legal Systems, 
50 VA. L. REV. 36 (1964). “The operational problem for the present-day international 
lawyer who is genuinely concerned with the attempt to accommodate the contending 
legal systems may in some sense seem to reduce to an exercise in comparative law—
comparative international law, if one wishes to be precise.” Id. at 54. McWhinney be-
lieved that by doing comparative international law, a U.S. and Soviet legal task force 
could find a ‘common core’ of international law where there is or is likely to be broad 
consensus and to separate and quarantine areas of controversy and divergence. 
 18. This is a heuristic choice, not a concrete historical claim. Comparative interna-
tional law can be said to have started earlier, perhaps as early as the very creation of clas-
sic European international law in the seventeenth century, and the attempts by peripheral 
non-European states to appropriate or create alternative visions of international law. See, 
e.g., Arnulf Becker Lorca, Universal International Law: Nineteenth-Century Histories of 
Imposition and Appropriation, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 521 (2010) (arguing that in the 
process of appropriating Western international law, elite non-Western international law 
jurists created a “particularistic universalism” conception of the international order). 
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A. The Interwar Period and Start of Alternatives 
World War I (“WWI”) and the formation of the League of Nations tra-
ditionally signify the start of modern international law.19 This period also 
coincides with arguably the most significant historical events of the 
twentieth century, the Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (“RSFSR”), and later the 
development of the Soviet Union. The two moments are of course inti-
mately interrelated, and their linkages and nuances have been fought 
over by historians, political scientists, and sociologists ever since. The 
moments also had great significance for the three disciplines at issue here 
(public international law, comparative law, and CIL). 
To the field of international law in the West, the Russian revolution 
signified a challenge. From its inception, the USSR squarely charged the 
architects of the League system and the Versailles Treaty with imperialist 
aims and threatened, quite bluntly, to demolish the international legal 
order by a series of worldwide workers’ revolutions.20 Inspired by the 
Marxist tradition, the Soviet state proposed an alternative domestic and 
global governance model that absolutely rejected longstanding classic 
liberal notions regarding private property, free trade, the organic class 
system (itself originating in the Aristotelian tradition, but rationalized by 
vulgarized interpretations of Charles Darwin’s natural selection theory), 
and so on. To traditional comparative law scholars, the Russian revolu-
tion produced a great family of law—the socialist legal system—that 
would go on to influence dozens of national domestic legal orders 
through direct imposition, indirect transplant, and law and development 
schemes.21 As discussed below, the Soviet state introduced a concrete 
programmatic proposal for the world’s colonized peoples and exploited 
workers.22 From its inception, it offered solidarity, material aid, and or-
ganizational resources to national liberation movements in opposition to 
European imperial powers. Equally important, it offered a theoretical and 
strategic alternative to the predominant global legal order. These devel-
opments stretched traditional disciplinary bounds, creating new fields 
(international political economy) but also for the first time, putting com-
parative law and international law into tension with one another. Whe-
reas traditionally, comparative law rested on the assumption of legal plu-
ralism and early twentieth century international law rested on an assump-
                                                                                                                                  
 19. Again, this is not the place to discuss the relevance of 1492, 1648, 1815, 1885 or 
other dates potentially integral to the development of international law. That lively debate 
is better held elsewhere. 
 20. See infra note 57. 
 21. See A. KH. SAIDOV, COMPARATIVE LAW 199 (W.E. Butler ed. & trans., 2003). 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 242–51. 
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tion of universality, these bright distinctions no longer held true. From 
this point forward, the need for CIL (defined as the study of alternative 
approaches to dominant governance paradigms) was born. 
B. A Historical Taxonomy 
How is CIL different from traditional comparative law, or traditional 
international legal theory, or the study of international legal history(ies)? 
In its most basic form, CIL, like basic comparative law, intends to sa-
tisfy our base instinct to catalog, shelve, sort, and understand.23 CIL is 
simply another form of legal taxonomy, built on the premise that its 
unique form of classification will facilitate an improved understanding of 
the law.24 CIL offers a chance to take stock of an increasingly pluralized 
and fractionalized global legal order, the ever-more complex maze of 
international, regional, and bilateral agreements, both hard and soft. As 
Emily Sherwin has observed, significant benefits can result from a useful 
categorization of the law: 
[O]rganisation of law into categories . . . facilitate[s] legal analysis and 
communication of legal ideas. . . . [A] comprehensive formal classifica-
tion of law provides a vocabulary and grammar that can make law more 
accessible and understandable to those who must use and apply it. It as-
sembles legal materials in a way that allows observers to view the law 
as a whole law. This in turn makes it easier for lawyers to argue effec-
tively about the normative aspects of law, for judges to explain their 
decisions, and for actors to coordinate their activities in response to 
law.25 
                                                                                                                                  
 23. VIVIAN GROSSWALD CURRAN, COMPARATIVE LAW 10–11 (2002). 
 24. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World’s 
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5, 5 (1997) [hereinafter Mattei, Three Patterns] 
(“[Taxonomy] provides the intellectual framework of the law and it makes the law’s 
complexity more manageable.”); see also Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation: Is 
There a “Field”? A Tribute to Hal Maier, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1427, 1430–32 
(2006); Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 243 (2000) 
(“Gaining knowledge of a subject is largely a matter of learning how to classify the sub-
ject and its constituent elements.”); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. 
L. REV. 477, 484 (2006) (contending that a good taxonomy “is not simply an attempt to 
catalog existing laws,” but advances our understanding of the area of the law and thereby 
“provide[s] a useful framework for its future development”); GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & 
SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 1 
(1999) (“To classify is human.”); 1 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW xxxi–ii (Peter Birks ed., 2000) 
(“The search for order is indistinguishable from the search for knowledge.”). 
 25. Emily Sherwin, Legal Positivism and the Taxonomy of Private Law, in 
STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW 103, 119 (Charles Rickett & Ross Gran-
tham eds., 2008) (internal citations omitted); see also Mattei, Three Patterns, supra note 
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A perfect taxonomy of international legal orders, then, offers a coherent 
way to sort among them, to distinguish patterns and commonalities, and 
to observe faultlines. There is a reason, after all, why René David and 
Rudolf Schlesinger’s systems and families analysis continues to offer 
very rough, but useful, guidance fifty years on.26 In its most elementary 
form, for instance, breaking legal systems into common law, Islamic law, 
civil law, and socialist (and now post-socialist) law is a useful pedagogi-
cal heuristic, indispensable for introducing students to different traditions 
despite the variances within the ‘families.’ 
Of course, comparativists know all too well that building a perfect 
framework for the world’s legal systems is not only exceedingly diffi-
cult, but may in fact be impossible. Attempts to construct grand com-
parative law narratives on ostensibly objective criteria have been shown 
to mask and replicate traditional historical infelicities.27 Thankfully, with 
the accelerating move away from the nation-state as the fundamental ju-
risdictional unit of comparison—Germany’s liability rules for nuisance28 
versus South Africa’s giving way to micro-level anthropological studies 
and ethnographies of decision making and adjudication processes29—
there are fewer and fewer calls for a perfectly coherent taxonomy, at 
least from the ranks of academic comparativists.30 
                                                                                                                                  
24, at 6 (“Taxonomy plays an important role in transferring knowledge from one area of 
the law to another.”). 
 26. Compare RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES, TEXTS, 
MATERIALS (1950), with UGO MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA, ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S 
COMPARATIVE LAW (7th ed., 2009) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW]. 
 27. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Encountering Amateurism: John Henry Wigmore and 
the Uses of American Formalism, in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
94, 118 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) [hereinafter Riles, Encountering Amateurism] (dis-
cussing early comparativist John Henry Wigmore’s attempt to analyze the Japanese legal 
system as a whole, what Riles refers to as “legal corporeology”). 
 28. See, e.g., Timothy Swanson & Andreas Kontoleon, Nuisance, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF L. & ECON. 380, 396 (2008). 
 29. See generally LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES 
(2001) (discussing dispute settlement mechanisms in indigenous Zapotec communities); 
see also infra text accompanying notes 327–29. 
 30. Contrast this with the universalizing, highly structured, and ostensibly coherent 
comparative law project afoot at the World Bank—the Doing Business Reports. See gen-
erally Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Busi-
ness Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765 
(2009) (considering the role of the Doing Business Reports in the field of comparative 
law); Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the 
Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) (analyzing and assessing the 
effectiveness of the Doing Business Reports). 
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Moreover, just as international law is undergoing a “turn to history” for 
theoretical inspiration,31 comparative law has also sought to make a “turn 
to politics” (and to history)32 to seek out direction and purpose.33 The 
conscientious wings of both disciplines, it seems, are essentially living 
out the story of the prodigal child returning home after realizing the 
world was far more complex than they had imagined. Naturally, since 
both have been out in the world, it makes sense to swap notes, exchange 
stories, find shared experiences, and identify common enemies they met 
along the road.34 To close the metaphor, however, it is important to real-
ize that there may not be any difference between the comparativist, the 
internationalist, and the comparative internationalist. They may all have 
traveled the same path, seen the same patterns, and returned home the 
same way, simply at different times. Taxonomies allow us to share these 
experiences. The taxonomic function of CIL, therefore, is not to stake out 
a new line of intellectual inquiry in the field of public international law, 
but rather, to map out ongoing and related intellectual projects within 
comparative law and international law and to bring them together to a 
coterminous end. 
Proceeding on this general plane, the modest role of a comparative in-
ternational lawyer, therefore, should be that of a liaison, a networker, or a 
matchmaker. Comparative international lawyers are not meant to be legal 
philosophers or great legal historians weaving tales of how nations used 
to solve functionally equivalent legal problems in unique ways by refer-
ence to archives or diplomatic histories. Rather, they are institution 
builders, conference organizers, and networkers. They are strategists, 
advisors, and diplomats who intuitively understand that every Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law, Israeli Yearbook of International Law, 
and Palestine Yearbook of International Law contains subtly (or radical-
ly) distinct approaches to identical problems; that state practice varies 
even in similar international fora because of differences in legal culture, 
language, and mentalité. As is shown in the Section on methodological 
minima,35 CIL practioners should aspire to embrace plurality among the 
world’s legal systems, not to gloss over it. Consistent with the general 
                                                                                                                                  
 31. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS (2002) (experi-
menting with the development of international law from a historical and political lens). 
 32. See generally RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Annelise Riles 
ed., 2001) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE MASTERS] (a collection of works discussing 
modern comparative law issues through a historical lens of the development of compara-
tive law). 
 33. Id. 
 34. As to why they ventured on the road out alone and not side by side, that is a mat-
ter for another day. 
 35. See infra Section II.B. 
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Hippocratic-like oath of the now ordinary comparativist, the goal of the 
CIL lawyer must be limited, to be interdisciplinary without claiming in-
terdisciplinarity,36 to understand and to translate foreign approaches to 
international norms and institutions without seeking to transform them. 
Three historical figures, Evgeny A. Korovin, John N. Hazard, and 
W.E. Butler help illustrate this spirit. 
1. Evgeny A. Korovin & Socialist International Law 
In the history of Soviet approaches to international law, an often over-
looked, but very important early figure is Evgeny A. Korovin (1892–
1964).37 Unlike the eminent Soviet legal theorist Evgeny Pashukanis—
whose contributions to Marxist legal theory have stood the test of time—
Korovin has been perennially neglected by Western scholars, who view 
him as a chameleon and whose career is seen as apologetic and mercuri-
al, partly because he escaped Stalin’s purges.38 The late American com-
parativist and Sovietologist John N. Hazard, for instance, remarked that 
“no . . . praise of Korovin as a pioneer ever appeared from any official 
pen.”39 This is surprising, as Korovin was one of the leading internation-
al lawyers in the Soviet Union,40 a Soviet member of the American So-
ciety of International Law,41 and charged with expounding Soviet legal 
                                                                                                                                  
 36. See generally Annelise Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and 
the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 597 (1994). Riles argues that 
claim of interdisciplinarity has lost much of its rhetorical force, but that interdisciplinary 
scholarship is helpful in that it discloses tension between “reflexive and normative modes 
of engagement with legal problems.” Id. at 597. 
 37. Pamiati Evgeniia Aleksandrovicha Korovina [In Memoriam Evgeny Alexandro-
vich Korovin], 1 PRAVOVEDENIE 201 (1965) [hereinafter In Memoriam], available at 
http://74.125.155.132/scholar?q=cache:rPNB0jSAUwUJ:scholar.google.com/&hl=en&as
_sdt=0,33. 
 38. Stunningly, for instance, Piers Beirne’s Revolution in Law: Contributions to the 
Development of Soviet Legal Theory, 1917-1938 (Piers Beirne ed., 1990), does not have a 
single mention of Korovin. Cf. Zofia Maclure, Soviet International Legal Theory—Past 
and Present, 5 FLETCHER F. 49, 49–54 (1981) (providing a good summary to Korovin’s 
work). Grewe offers one citation of Korovin’s Das Völkerrecht (International Law of the 
Transition Period) for the proposition that a “fundamental conception of communism 
[was] that the existing international legal order was only a provisional and transitory 
system of practical intercourse between socialist and capitalist states.” WILHELM H. 
GREWE, EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (internal citation omitted). For Grewe’s 
retelling of the Soviet transition period (1919–1939), see id. at 604–05. 
 39. Hazard, Foreword to PASHUKANIS, SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW 
xii (Piers Beirne & Robert Sharlet eds., Peter B. Maggs trans., 1980). 
 40. In Memoriam, supra note 37; Maclure, supra note 38, at 51, 53. 
 41. DIPLOMATICHESKII SLOVAR’: T.1.: A-K [DIPLOMATIC DICTIONARY, P. 1: A-K] (A. 
Ia. Vyshinskii, S.A. Lozovskii eds., 1948), available at 
http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/dic_diplomatic/688/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
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theory to American scholars.42 For the first decade of his career as an 
international lawyer, Korovin’s writing was interpreted as the official 
pronouncement of the Soviet state.43 No less of an authority than Vlada-
mir E. Grabar44 had called Korovin “the leading Soviet international law 
theorist.”45 Yet until now, little has been known about his life. 
Korovin was born in 1892 in Moscow to a middle-class family.46 His 
father was a doctor and the head of the First Moscow Society on Sobrie-
ty, an anti-alcoholism clinic and advocacy group.47 He was a prodigious 
student and assisted his father with publications.48 By age twelve, Koro-
vin began translating the poetry of French poets Lemaitre, Mallarmé, and 
Gautier.49 Details about his student life in Moscow are unclear, though 
an unpublished autobiography may reveal more about his formative 
years.50 Korovin graduated from Moscow State University in 191551 dur-
                                                                                                                                  
 42. See, e.g., Eugene A. Korovin, Soviet Treaties and International Law, 22 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 753 (1928); Eugene A. Korovin, The Problems of the International Recognition 
of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in Practice, 19 IOWA L. REV. 259 (1934); Eu-
gene A. Korovin, The Second World War and International Law, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 742 
(1946) [hereinafter Korovin, The Second World War]; David J. Bederman, Appraising a 
Century of Scholarship in the American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
20, 34 n.101 (2006) (citing Korovin’s 1928 article in AJIL and acknowledging AJIL’s 
publication of the “occasional Soviet publicist”). 
 43. L. Ratner, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo v Marksistkom Osveshchenii [International 
Law in Marxist Light], 6 SOVETSKOE GOSUDARSTVO [SOVIET STATE] 128, 130 (1935) 
(acknowledging that the only scholarship available to foreign observers on Soviet inter-
national law was Korovin’s, leading to the misconception that his scholarship represented 
the official Soviet doctrine). 
 44. Vladimir E. Grabar (1865–1956) was one of the leading Russian international law 
scholars, whose career spanned both the Imperial and Soviet eras. Among his principal 
works was THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RUSSIA (1647–1917) (W.E. Butler 
trans., 1990). See W.E. Butler, Introduction to PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 
1–2 (W.E. Butler ed., 1990) [hereinafter PERESTROIKA]. 
 45. Kozhevnikov, Na Samom Otstalom Uchastke Na Fronte Sovetskogo Prava [On 
The Most Laggard Wing in the Battlefield of the Soviet Law], 3 SOVETSKOE 
GOSUDARSTVO I REVOLIUTSIIA PRAVA [SOVIET STATE L. & REVOLUTION] 146, 150 (1930) 
(mocking Grabar’s praise of Korovin). 
 46. See Evgenii Korovin, VEKPEREVODA.COM, 
http://www.vekperevoda.com/1887/korovin.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2011). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. The standard biography from the Institute of Soviet Law does not provide details 
on this period of his life. See Evgeny Alexandrovich Korovin, 1 SOVETSKOE 
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [SOVIET STATE & L.] 133 (1965); see also W.E. Butler, Soviet 
International Legal Education: The Pashukanis Syllabus, 2 REV. SOCIALIST L. 79, 85, 
n.34 (1976) (describing the unpublished autobiography). Korovin’s personal papers are 
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ing the height of Russia’s campaign in WWI. It is unclear what his posi-
tion was during the war or during the revolutionary period, but it is 
known that he began teaching in Moscow shortly after the revolution.52 
By 1923 (at age 31), Korovin was a full professor of law at Moscow 
State University and an assistant of the Institute of Soviet Law (Institut 
Sovekogo Prava) of the Russian Association of Scientific Institutes of the 
Social Sciences the predecessor of the Institute of State and Law of the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences.53 With respect to his international creden-
tials, and language skills, there is indication that Korovin read English 
and possibly German, was fluent in French, and monitored Western lite-
rature on Soviet law.54 
His earliest works on international law are a series of articles in the 
journal Sovetskoe Pravo, from the very first issue in 1922.55 Between 
1922 and 1924, Korovin published articles on the principle of most fa-
vored nations,56 League of Nations,57 rebus sic stantibus,58 and diplomat-
ic recognition of the Soviet Union by other nations.59 By the end of the 
1920s, following the reorganization of the legal research institutes and 
law faculties, Korovin was elevated to a professorship in international 
law at Moscow State University, and taught international law and inter-
national relations at a large number of Moscow institutes of higher learn-
ing, including the Moscow Juridical Institute and the Moscow Diplomat-
ic Academy.60 
                                                                                                                                  
held at the St. Petersburg affiliate of the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 
fund No. 1552, available at http://www.rusarchives.ru/guide/lf_ussr/kom_kor.shtml. 
 51. See In Memoriam, supra note 37. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See L.E. Lapteva, Istoriia Instituta [History of the Institute], 
http://www.igpran.ru/about/index.php (last accessed Feb. 15, 2011). 
 54. See Letter from John N. Hazard to Walter S. Rogers, Dir. of the Inst. of Current 
World Affairs (Nov. 24, 1934). 
 55. E.A. Korovin, Inostrannaia Filantropicheskaia Deiatel’nost’ v R.S.F.S.R.I Pra-
vovye Formy [Foreign Philanthropic Activities in the R.S.F.S.R. and its Legal Forms], 1 
SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 108 (1922). 
 56. Е.А. Korovin, Uslovie Naibol’shego Blagopriiastvovaniia v Dogovorah 
R.S.F.S.R. [The Most Favored Nation Principle in Treaties of the USSR], 3 SOVETSKOE 
PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 30, 30–31 (1923). 
 57. Е.А. Korovin, Liga Natsii I Evoliutsiia [The League of Nations and Its Evolution], 
4 SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 36, 36–43 (1923). 
 58. Е.А. Korovin, Ogovorka Rebus Sic Stantibus v Mezhdunarodnoi Praktike 
R.S.F.S.R. [The Principle Rebus Sic Stantibus in International Practice of the 
R.S.F.S.R.], 6 SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 52 (1922). 
 59. Е.А. Korovin, Mezhdunarodnoe Priznanie S.S.S.R.I Iuridicheskie Ego Pos-
ledstviia [International Recognition of the U.S.S.R. and Its Legal Consequences] 9 
SOVETSKOE PRAVO [SOVIET L.] 76, 76–86 (1924). 
 60. See In Memoriam, supra note 37. 
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In 1924, the year of Lenin’s death61 and the year Pashukanis published 
his influential General Theory of Law and Marxism,62 Korovin published 
International Law of the Transition Period.63 The initial print run was 
5,000 copies, significant for the first Soviet attempt to formulate a theory 
of international law and international relations. In 1924, Korovin pub-
lished a short work on Soviet treaties, International Conventions and 
Acts of the New Era.64 One year later, he published a teaching manual, 
Contemporary Public International Law,65 which is likely the first CIL 
textbook. In 1929, a second edition of International Law of the Transi-
tion Period was translated into German.66 In addition, between 1924–
1928, Korovin published close to ten articles and book reviews on inter-
national law in the journal Sovetskoe Pravo. 
Korovin’s corpus of early work is important to our study for several 
reasons. First, as one of the two leading authorities on international law 
during the 1922–1939 period, he had a tremendous influence on an entire 
generation of Soviet international law scholars and practitioners.67 The 
wide distribution of his works and the large print runs and reissues signi-
fy that Korovin’s theories, despite being criticized by the Pashukanis 
camp, were actually quite widely read and taught. Second, Korovin’s 
work offers the first glance into early Soviet comparative law, for Koro-
vin routinely relied on ‘bourgeois’ examples and Western legal systems 
                                                                                                                                  
 61. 7 VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 264 (15th ed. 
2005). 
 62. Evgeny Pashukanis, Obshchaia Teoiia Prava I Marksizm: Opyt Kritiki Osnov-
nykh Iuridicheskikh Poniatii [The General Theory of Law and Marxism] (1924), re-
printed in SELECTED WRITINGS ON MARXISM AND LAW (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds., Peter 
B. Maggs trans., 1980), available at 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/pashukanis/1924/law/index.htm. 
 63. Е.А. KOROVIN, MEŽDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREKHODNOGO VREMENI 
[INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD] (1924) (Russ.) [hereinafter KOROVIN, 
ILTP]. 
 64. Е.А. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNYE DOGOVORY I AKTY NOVOGO VREMENI 
[INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND ACTS OF THE NEW ERA] (1924). 
 65. Е.А. KОROVIN, SOVREMENNOE MEZHDUNARODNOE PUBLICHNOE PRAVO 
[CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW] (1926) [hereinafter KOROVIN, CIPL]. 
Contemporary public international law was devoted to explaining contemporary Euro-
pean-American conceptions of international law, rather than providing a systematic So-
viet perspective. Korovin meant for it to be read simultaneously with his International 
Law of the Transition Period for an understanding of the Soviet position on given issues. 
Id. at 3–4. 
 66. E.A. KOROWIN, DAS VOLKERRECHT DER UBERGANGSWEIT (1929). 
 67. See Lauri Malksoo, The History of International Legal Theory in Russia: A Civili-
zational Dialogue with Europe, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 211, 226 (2008); see also Earl A. 
Snyder & Hans Werner Bracht, Coexistence and International Law, 7 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 54, 59 (1958). 
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to make his point about Soviet legal theory.68 John Hazard, who regular-
ly met with Korovin in the course of his studies at the Moscow Juridical 
Institute, noted that Korovin was the first to introduce the study of An-
glo-American law to Russia through his lectures on the topic in the early 
1930s.69 
Korovin devoted great energy to the study of English and American 
law, going so far as to translate the 1872 California Code into Russian.70 
To some, Korovin’s comparative work may not seem rigorous and may 
appear to contain mostly Marxist-inspired platitudes about Western legal 
systems. For instance, Korovin taught that English law, though it was 
capitalist in function, was in actuality, feudal in form71—though why this 
distinction mattered was not clear to Hazard.72 The Whigs and the prop-
ertied class controlled the courts in England, Korovin taught, they vigo-
rously maintained the archaic form of the judicial system, adding to the 
mystique and “hypnosis of law.”73 However, not having studied in Eng-
land, Korovin’s observations were derived from his own interpretation of 
secondary texts. 
Nevertheless, despite the understandable opposition to bourgeois juri-
sprudence and amateuristic comparisons,74 Korovin actually allowed for 
the introduction and transplantation of foreign legal concepts and sys-
tems into the Soviet Union. Korovin pointed out that the 1934 Soviet 
Civil Code, for instance, was modeled on the Swiss Civil Code and was 
compiled in just five months at the Intitute of Soviet Law.75 Likewise, 
Korovin introduced elements from the German legal academy to influ-
ence Russian law teaching, both substantively and with respect to teach-
ing method.76 Korovin was deeply familiar with the three reigning 
                                                                                                                                  
 68. See, e.g., Korovin, The Second World War, supra note 42, at 747–48; Mintauts 
Chakste, Soviet Concepts of the State, International Law and Sovereignty, 43 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 21, 31 (1949); Malksoo, supra note 67, at 226 (quoting a passage from Korovin ex-
plaining the break of Soviet international law from that of Europe). 
 69. John N. Hazard, Fragments of Lectures on the History of International Relations 
29 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Bakhmeteff Archive, Columbia University 
Library System) [hereinafter Hazard, Fragments]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. The term ‘amateurism’ is by now a term of art in comparative law, and should not 
be read as derogatory. It refers to lack of language skills, or improper definition of the 
subject of study in comparative projects. See, e.g., Riles, supra note 27, at 94–100, 104 
(pointing out Wigmore’s deficient language skills), 118 (discussing legal systems analy-
sis and legal corporeology). 
 75. Hazard, Fragments, supra note 69, at 36. 
 76. Id. at 29. 
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‘scientific’ schools of international law of the time—the natural law tra-
dition, the historical school (Savigny), and the school of Rudolf von 
Jhering—and was especially influenced by the third, as this represented 
to Korovin the closest approximation of the realist theory of international 
law and international relations.77 Korovin saw that Jhering “looked at 
law as the juridical defense of interests” and that law was, at its core, 
political strength, though he criticized Jhering for failing to see the class 
nature of law despite having read Marx.78 
To understand the value of Korovin’s work, it is important to appre-
ciate that he was the first to apply Marxism to international law79 and the 
first to offer a critical comparison of Western international law with the 
emerging Soviet system.80 A brief overview of two of his un-translated 
works illustrates his scholarly contributions. 
International Law of the Transition Period opens by explaining the 
novelty of the task: the first attempt, in Russian or international litera-
ture, to study problems of international law in the transition period be-
tween capitalism and communism.81 For the Soviets, the core problem of 
the transition period was how to open daily diplomatic-level interactions 
with representatives of the Western powers without compromising the 
Soviet rejection of bourgeois law and the Soviet repudiation of the “legal 
inheritance” (read: debt) of the Tsarist and Kerensky governments.82 In 
these first negotiations between the West and representatives of the So-
viet Republic, Korovin admits, Soviet diplomats reverted to a familiar (or 
what he calls, ‘stereotypical’) ‘phraseology’ and reliance on ‘commonly 
accepted’ bases of international law, going so far as to rely on Imperial 
Russian treaties in support of Soviet agendas.83 Therefore, one of the first 
problems Korovin sought to address was the continuity in forms between 
capitalist and communist international legal orders.84 
                                                                                                                                  
 77. Id. at 29–32. 
 78. Id. See generally RUDOLF VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik 
trans., Macmillan 1921) (1914) (a great work by the legal philosopher Ihering, consider-
ing how purpose is the foundation of legal systems). 
 79. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 28–35. 
 80. See KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65. 
 81. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 1. 
 82. Id. at 5. 
 83. Id. Korovin later successfully defended his position of maintaining continuity of 
terminology between the Russian and Soviet periods on practical grounds. Since the So-
viet interpretation of such terms would be qualitatively different from bourgeois interpre-
tations, it made no difference what terms were used. See also KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 
65. 
 84. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63. 
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Secondly, notwithstanding Soviet diplomats’ use of the familiar lan-
guage and concepts of bourgeois international law,85 Western diplomats 
began to lodge steady protests that, despite Soviet willingness to nego-
tiate, the USSR was violating customary law, particularly with respect to 
the repudiation of the Kerensky and Tsarist debt.86 Korovin immediately 
saw this as proof of his earlier indeterminacy theory.87 That is, despite 
the use of common forms and attempts to agree on substantive points, 
international jurists on both sides of the negotiating table would be able 
to interpret their obligations in radically different ways. Rather than use 
international law substantively or “on the merits,” Korovin realized the 
immense practical applicability of his indeterminacy critique.88 In what 
he called legal instrumentalism, Korovin openly argued for elastic legal 
standards as a way to both undermine the bourgeois concept of law and 
to afford the young Soviet state room to operate in a hostile foreign envi-
ronment.89 
Unlike Pashukanis, it seems Korovin was not concerned with theoriz-
ing an internally coherent Marxist social order; his goal, rather, was to 
apply a Marxist critique to existing international law and institutions and 
to provide a guide for Soviet practice. Korovin was fully aware of the 
difficulty of reconciling Marxism with law and legal institutions and de-
vised his transition theory to accommodate both law and its eventual dis-
appearance.90 But he elided these subtleties, beginning, like Lenin before 
him, with the axiom that where there is society there is law (gde obsh-
                                                                                                                                  
 85. Korovin gives as an example the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference of 
1922, which was headed by G.V. Chicherin, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs 
from 1918 to 1930. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63; see also Maclure, supra note 38, at 
50. 
 86. ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEBT AND REPUTATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 133 n.52 citing Herschel 
Grossman & John B. Van Huyck, Debt Repudiation Rouses All Nations: Joint Protest 
Made by 19 Envoys in Petrograd—Bonds Used as Currency, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 20, 1918) 
(on file with authors); see also id. at 107–52 (describing the joint protest issued by each 
country with representatives in Soviet Russia in 1918 to the debt repudiation decree). 
 87. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63. 
 88. Boris N. Mamlyuk, Russia & Legal Harmonization: An Historical Inquiry into IP 
Reform as Global Convergence and Resistance, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Mamlyuk, Legal 
Harmonization]. 
 89. Е.А. Kоrovin, K Peresmotru Osnovnykh Poniatiĭ Mezhdunarodnogo Prava, [To-
wards a Reexamination of the Main Tenets of International Law], 18 SОVЕТSКОЕ PRАVО 
[SOVIET L.] 25, 26 (1925) (arguing for a need to develop “sufficiently elastic legal forms 
capable of accommodating two polar legal orders”) [hereinafter Korovin, Towards a 
Reexamination]. 
 90. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 6. 
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chezhitie—tam pravo).91 To Korovin, this maxim is not only the product 
of legal dialectics, but constituted a sociological fact.92 Thus, internation-
al law and diplomacy were necessaries so long as states existed. More 
concretely, as long as the USSR was surrounded by imperialistic states 
with whom it remained necessary to have relations,93 such relations 
would need to be grounded in a legal basis.94 To Korovin, it was scholas-
tic to theorize the essence of law, when in actuality—after realizing that 
all law is politics and strength—it was important to assure the USSR’s 
place in the world by way of legal mechanisms.95 The only remaining 
question was of substance and adapting legal instruments to attain Soviet 
interests. 
Korovin’s main thesis is that international law was a temporary com-
promise between the USSR and other states in different stages of eco-
nomic development on the road to a world revolution.96 The implications 
of this compromise were dire: “as long as the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by 
capitalist states,” declares Korovin, “it must remain in legal ‘isolation’—
it cannot become either an object or subject of the bourgeois trapeze.”97 
This required the negation of practically all fundamental international 
law concepts, including the sources of international law, and its subjects, 
                                                                                                                                  
 91. Korovin, Towards a Reexamination, supra note 89. 
 92. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 6. 
 93. The “capitalist encirclement” theory was, in the view of American diplomats, 
incompatible with a desire for permanent peaceful coexistence. See GEORGE F. KENNAN, 
MEMOIRS, 1925–1950, at 547 (1967) (Excerpts from a Telegraphic Message from Mos-
cow, dated February 22, 1946, quoting Stalin’s remarks to a delegation of American 
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 94. The word for ‘relations’ in Russian is further divided into multiple variants (vzai-
mootnoshenie, otnoshenie, snoshenie). Vzaimootnoshenie refers to interrelations; otno-
shenie is relations generally, whereas snoshenie means something between interaction 
and contact. See W.E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY 27, 145, 210 
(2001). 
 95. See Maclure, supra note 38, at 53. 
 96. For a different restatement of the transition theory, see I.А. ISAEV, ISTORIYA 
GOSUDARSTVA I PRAVA ROSSII [HISTORY OF STATE AND LAWIN RUSSIA] (1996); see also 
I.А. ISAEV,TOPOS I NOMOS: PROSTRANSTVA  PRAVOPORIADKOV [SPACE LAW AND ORDER] 
348 (2007) (“A Russian federation was conceptualized as a transition stage on the way to 
an eventual political union, a period during which people would trounce national (ethnic) 
differences, and progress towards world revolution.”). 
 97. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 44. 
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objects, and institutions.98 To Korovin, even the most entrenched sources 
of international law—treaties—were unreliable as objective determinants 
of state conduct.99 Korovin routinely pointed out the indeterminacy of 
particular treaties, showing that the same terms were used by opposing 
parties to signify contradictory concepts.100 
At the same time, Korovin was a consummate realist and pragmatist. 
Mindful of political disagreements as potential roadblocks to coopera-
tion, he outlined a dualistic system of international law in which coun-
tries could agree on apolitical matters (for instance, international public 
health and epidemics, defense of international historical monuments, or 
artwork), while maintaining intellectual opposition on other issues.101 
Korovin’s title for the former category was international administrative 
law,102 a theory that continues to have purchase with respect to complete-
ly uncontroversial sub-fields of international law, such as international 
laws concerning postal carriage.103 Korovin was also the author of the 
Soviet tripartite theory of international law, which divided international 
law into three camps: law between socialist states,104 law between capi-
talist states vis-à-vis each other, and law between socialist states and ca-
pitalist states.105 Perhaps most importantly, Korovin realized the tre-
mendous practical and theoretical value to be gained from devising a 
theory of perpetual transition, although he never formally identified it as 
such. 
                                                                                                                                  
 98. The chapters are: (1) International law in the system of Soviet law, (2) Interna-
tional law of the transition period in the history of international relations, (3) Essence and 
nature of international law of the transition period, (4) The state as the subject of interna-
tional law, (5) Organs of international relations, (6) International treaties, (7) Main issues 
in the law of war, (8) Conclusion. See KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63. 
 99. Id. at 15–16; see also Chakste, supra note 68, at 27. 
 100. Korovin gives as an example the negotiations between Richard von Kühlmann 
and Trotsky leading to the Brest-Litovsk treaty. KOROVIN, ILTP, supra note 63, at 13. 
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 102. See id.; KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65. 
 103. See KOROVIN, CIPL, supra note 65. 
 104. The idea of an independent international law between socialist states is not differ-
ent from the idea of an international law proper as law “between (European) states that 
shared similar ideas about statehood and its social functions.” MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE 
GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS 282 (citing Pillet’s Le droit international public and dis-
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non-Europeans lacked the advanced degree of civilization necessary to understand the 
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 105. See Maclure, supra note 38, at 52. 
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This theory of perpetual transition effectively underpinned the theory 
(or at least, the ethos) of Soviet exceptionalism until the collapse of the 
USSR.106 It is striking that in the whole corpus of Korovin’s work there 
is absolutely no indication that socialism would arrive at any proximate 
date or that the length of the transition even mattered. Similar to Pashu-
kanis, it seems Korovin understood that socialist international law would 
exist so long as the USSR remained obligated to negotiate and deal with 
capitalist states.107 As Korovin wrote in his preface to International Law 
of the Transition Period, the five year experience of war and agreements 
between the socialist Soviet state and capitalist states was an insignifi-
cant period of time in the realm of international relations.108 Transition 
was going to take a long time; accordingly, socialist international law 
could remain in a state of permanent transition, similar to the notion of 
‘permanent exception’ popularized by Carl Schmitt and his contempo-
rary appropriators and critics.109 
Korovin’s book Contemporary Public International Law reiterates 
many of the themes of International Law of the Transition Period but is 
much more heavily criticized, possibly because of its intended use as a 
teaching manual.110 David Levin, a disciple of Pashukanis at the Com-
munist Academy, attacked Korovin precisely for ignoring larger theoret-
ical questions.111 “From a theoretical point of view,” Levin wrote, “the 
book is lacking a Marxist methodology and even evidences a certain 
dogmatism.”112 According to Levin, Korovin limited himself to “tradi-
tional dogmatic formulation of the main theoretical questions pertaining 
to international law (resembling any regular bourgeois work).”113 Levin 
especially criticized Korovin’s treatment of the USSR as a quasi-subject 
                                                                                                                                  
 106. The extent to which the Soviet Union claimed exceptional status in international 
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under international law, simultaneously bound by international treaties, 
and at the same time, because of the unique extraterritorial class nature 
of the Soviet experiment, resembling something of a proletarian move-
ment rather than a traditional territorial state.114 Contrary to Korovin, 
Levin argued that: 
Practically speaking, the USSR, as the only socialist state, is required to 
guard itself from the capitalist world by way of legal barriers (sove-
reignty, equality) and at the same time uphold the international law 
form of statehood even more intensively than bourgeois states, which, 
in the period of imperialism lose much of their significance.115 
Yet Levin’s view, which would come to dominate Soviet international 
legal theory from the mid-1930s until the zenith of ‘classical’ Soviet in-
ternational law in the post-WWII period, portrayed a gross misunders-
tanding of the strategic implications of Korovin’s indeterminacy and 
transition theories. 
Pashukanis disciples also criticized Korovin in a series of articles in 
the Encyclopedia of State and Law.116 In the realm of international law, 
the main disagreement was that Korovin claimed the Soviet Union could 
create new international legal forms.117 According to Hazard, the Pashu-
kanis camp “argued that Korovin was philosophically wrong [because] 
the international law being applied by Soviet diplomats could not be 
something new. International law could be only what it had been under 
the influences of capitalism.”118 But these aspects of the debate missed 
the broader basis of disagreement—namely, whether there was a tactical 
advantage to the Soviets in claiming the existence of an exceptional out-
look on international law. To the Pashukanis camp, this argument was a 
non-starter, as all state relations mirrored relations between commodity 
owners, whether or not those relations occurred between capitalist states 
and ostensible ‘socialist’ ones. Therefore, the notion of socialist interna-
tional law, as somehow unique from general international law, was a log-
ical impossibility. To Korovin, however, comparing competing interna-
tional law traditions to one’s own offered a useful frame for a prolonged 
attack on the competing system. 
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Contemporary Public International Law was, in other words, the first 
large-scale attempt by a Soviet jurist to present a systematic critique of 
the Western view of international law. For all the critical insight, the ul-
tra-leftist Pashukanis camp119 missed the brilliant advance that Korovin 
made. Read together, International Law of the Transition Period and 
Comparative Public International Law describe how, despite being bitter 
ideological foes, two states modeled on radically different economic 
models could, and would, coexist in parallel universes and cooperate 
with each other on matters of common concern. This tremendous insight 
would, of course, go on to form the basis for the doctrine of coexis-
tence120 and, eventually, the doctrine of permanent peaceful coexistence 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis.121 However, perhaps partly because of the 
rapid development of international law in the USSR and the West after 
World War II (“WWII”), Korovin’s contributions to peaceful coexis-
tence were never credited. 
Yet, here was a comparative international lawyer, par excellence, who 
had resisted the common Marxist urge to draw caricatures of Western 
models and institutions,122 to perform simple comparison by contrast, or 
to define himself solely in opposition to an imagined bourgeois foe, ra-
ther than a realistic assessment of a powerful adversary.123 Though he 
was subject to intense criticism at home and abroad, Korovin’s stance 
offers three lessons for the understanding of CIL. First, Korovin’s expe-
rience shows that it was possible to set aside ideological disagreements 
with representatives of competing systems in an effort to build institu-
tional links with rival theoretical and political schools. Second, as Koro-
vin demonstrated, CIL could reveal inner tensions within the competing 
system, serving as a useful base for critique. Lastly, Korovin’s CIL work 
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evidences the pitfalls from corporeological accounts of a competing sys-
tem, highlighting the need for narrow subject inquiry and methodological 
rigor. 
2. John N. Hazard & Comparative Law 
Unlike Korovin, John N. Hazard (1909–1995) is familiar to most com-
parative law scholars, Russian law experts, and American international-
ists. Hazard’s contribution to the field of CIL is indebted to Korovin, as 
much of his scholarship draws upon the letters and notes he wrote while 
auditing Korovin’s international law courses at the Moscow Juridical 
Institute from 1934–1937.124 These materials, now preserved in the 
Bakhmeteff Archive at the Columbia University Library, not only pro-
vide a glimpse into how international law was taught in 1930s Soviet 
Union, they also shed an important light on method and methodology 
when thinking about CIL.125 
Hazard’s career as a Sovietologist began following his graduation from 
Harvard Law School in 1934 when he was sent to Moscow as an Institute 
of Current World Affairs fellow to attend, and report on, Russian law 
courses.126 Hazard took three courses related to international law while a 
student, all under Korovin: introduction to international law; history of 
international relations; and public international law.127 Beyond the class 
notes, Hazard also provided brief sketches of Korovin in correspondence 
with his supervisors in the U.S.128 Hazard’s initial impression of Korovin 
was that he was a “scholarly man[,] . . . well-schooled in the Marxist atti-
tude, and the reasons given by the authorities for [Soviet foreign policy 
decisions].”129 In addition to classes, Hazard met with Korovin on a 
weekly basis in the latter’s home, learning Russian and allowing Korovin 
to practice his English language skills.130 
Hazard began his long and prolific scholarly career while still in Mos-
cow, publishing articles in the Columbia Law Review131 and the Ameri-
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can Journal of International Law.132 After returning from Moscow in 
1937, Hazard enrolled in a doctorate program at Chicago University, 
studying comparative law under the supervision of Max Rheinstein.133 In 
1938, Hazard publicized the expulsion of Pashukanis and the ensuing 
attempts to “cleanse” Soviet international law of his impure theories.134 
After completing his doctoral training at Chicago in 1939, Hazard joined 
a law firm in New York City, but with the outbreak of WWII he took a 
position with the U.S. government, where he was assigned to the Soviet 
desk in the Division of Defense Aid Reports.135 As part of his duties, he 
helped negotiate the conditions under which the Soviet Union became a 
major recipient of the Lend-Lease program.136 
Hazard ultimately became deputy director of the Soviet branch of the 
Lend-Lease Administration, gaining the friendship of America’s post-
war foreign policy elite, among them George Kennan, Dean Acheson, 
and Averell Harriman.137 As an expert on the USSR, Hazard accompa-
nied Vice President Henry Wallace on his secret mission to China in 
May, 1944 through Eastern Siberia.138 The following year he was chosen 
as an expert on Soviet law to assist Justice Robert Jackson in preparing 
the prosecution of Nazi leaders to be brought before an international tri-
bunal for war crimes.139 These experiences gave Hazard an unmatched 
command of not only Russian law, but also the inner workings of diplo-
macy, international courts, and institutions. 
After WWII, Hazard entered the legal academy at Columbia Universi-
ty, where he remained until his death.140 Columbia so prized his back-
ground that it offered him the rare honor of a tenured position to start.141 
He immediately drew on his Moscow training (and notes) to prepare 
teaching manuals for his students at Columbia. His post-War publica-
tions ran the gamut from public law and Soviet constitutional theory, 
criminal law, family law, and of course, Soviet international relations 
and international law.142 
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For the purposes of this Article, the most striking aspect of Hazard’s 
work on Soviet international law was its sincere attempt to project a neu-
tral view on the Soviet position and its philosophical origins.143 Hazard’s 
writings on Marxism showed deep sensitivity for the inner tensions and 
political pressures in which the Soviet jurists were working. He plainly 
understood the irreconcilable positions taken by Soviet scholars in de-
fense of party decisions and he could sense the personal disenchantment 
those scholars felt when they had to renounce their positions weeks, 
months, or years later. Hazard’s mindfulness of these tensions was both 
descriptive and analytical. He understood the paradox of so-called 
‘Marxist law’—that any law, as such, would mimic the logic of capital 
relations—but Hazard also understood the intellectual, institutional, and 
historical web that made exposing this precarious symmetry impossible 
for the Soviet jurists, including the later Pashukanis.144 
Precisely because of these sentiments, and in the heightened atmos-
phere of McCarthyism, it was even feared Hazard had “gone native” and 
was complicit in the global communist conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. 
“from within.”145 He was investigated by the House Un-American Activ-
ities Committee, but was ultimately cleared.146 Paradoxically, following 
this episode, the USSR would not issue Hazard an entry visa to the So-
viet Union, a fact he did not reveal publicly to many people.147 A victim 
of the hyper-politicization of the disciplines of international and compar-
ative law in the Cold War period, Hazard’s experience teaches a practical 
lesson confronting potential CIL scholars today—despite best attempts to 
find a neutral, objective, or ‘scientific’ base for comparison, it is always 
possible to expose an underlying set of existing legal/political traditions 
or perhaps even an ideological taint. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Hazard read with optimism the ano-
nymous leading article in the September 1956 Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i 
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Pravo, urging a reevaluation of the work of the interwar period.148 To the 
scholarship of international law, Hazard hoped that a reexamination 
would put an end to the spinning of “fine theories,” and focus work on 
“specific problems” rather than the core “problem of the conflict between 
states of differing economic systems.”149 Hazard understood how little 
good would flow from setting up ‘clashes of civilizations,’ from feeding 
into the mania of communism versus capitalism, good versus evil, us 
versus them.150 Thus, he focused his life’s work on debunking these 
myths, on teaching several generations of scholars to think critically 
about the Soviet ‘other,’ and to understand the inner tensions, conflicts, 
and incongruities within the Soviet system through as pragmatic, realis-
tic, and apolitical a lens as possible.151 This was the great lesson he 
learned from the American realist school of the 1930s under Manley O. 
Hudson and Roscoe Pound, and the Soviet realist school of Korovin; it 
was perfectly fine to immerse oneself in the ‘Other’s’ legal culture, to 
establish institutional and professional links between warring systems,152 
and to conceptualize the nature and functions of international institutions 
(like the League of Nations) from radically different perspectives.153 
3. W.E. Butler’s CIL Jurisprudence 
The third pivotal figure in the development of CIL in the twentieth 
century is eminent Russian law scholar, Professor William E. Butler. The 
author of more than one hundred books (monographs, edited works, and 
translations) and over three thousand total publications (and counting) on 
Soviet, Russian, and Commonwealth of Independent State (“CIS”) 
law,154 Butler hardly needs introduction to most international and com-
parative lawyers. A quick biography and overview of his main works on 
CIL helps contextualize the methodological discussion that follows. 
Butler was born in Minnesota in 1939 and completed his undergra-
duate studies at American University’s School of International Service in 
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1961.155 Butler then attended the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 
International Studies (“SAIS”), taking Jerome Cohen’s and John Ha-
zard’s course on Chinese, Soviet, and comparative law.156 After receiv-
ing his MA in 1963 from Johns Hopkins, Butler enrolled at Harvard Law 
School where he continued studying Soviet law under Harold J. Ber-
man.157 Butler returned to SAIS for his doctoral studies, completing a 
dissertation in 1970 on the “Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea.”158 
Understanding Butler’s institutional and academic lineage is vital, for it 
explains the similarities in comparative approaches of the three exem-
plary CIL scholars. 
In 1967 and 1968, Butler began teaching as a lecturer on the Soviet 
portion of a Harvard course titled “Soviet, Chinese and Western Ap-
proaches to International Law.”159 The heavily subscribed course was co-
taught by Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (on Chinese approaches),160 
Harold Berman and Butler (on Soviet approaches), and Richard R. Bax-
ter (on American approaches).161 Employing a combination of textual 
analysis and functionalism162 from the point of departure of a standard 
U.S. international law syllabus,163 the experts on Soviet and Chinese law 
would draw on foreign doctrinal and practice materials to answer how 
each nation would approach the given topic.164 In 1970, Butler was ele-
vated to a readership in comparative law at University College London 
(“UCL”),165 and from 1975, he led a graduate-level seminar, “compara-
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tive approaches to international law.”166 The UCL course was not heavily 
subscribed and was only offered intermittently for five or six years.167 
Butler’s subsequent CIL work built directly on these teaching expe-
riences. In 1977, Butler selected essays on CIL for publication in a stand-
alone volume, International Law in Comparative Perspective (“ILCP”), 
the first English-language work on comparative approaches to interna-
tional law.168 ILCP brought together seventeen works, including essays 
by McDougal, Schwarzenberger, and Gutteridge,169 and offered a valua-
ble introduction to the comparative method as applied to international 
law, especially with respect to comparative histories of international law. 
Butler went on to develop his own indispensible methodological insights, 
drawing on and rejecting many of the theories proposed by these very 
scholars. 
Butler openly rejected the artificial divide set by the earlier interwar 
generations of comparativists and internationalists.170 Thus, Butler re-
jected as anachronistic Gutteridge’s and other comparativists’ disinclina-
tion to engage with either private or public international law.171 The 
posture of pre-WWII international lawyers was similarly antediluvian, 
Butler argued.172 Because of the mainstream international law preoccu-
pation with nation states, formalist reliance on treaties for positive law, 
and overarching spirit of universality, there was hardly a need to study 
how states internalized international obligations, or exhibited general 
principles.173 In addition to being factually counterintuitive, such post-
ures undermine the idea of custom as a traditional source of international 
law. 
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Butler also rejected the pragmatic, policy-oriented, comparative style 
of the American legal realists because it constrained the potential scope 
of inquiry to only like systems. 
Comparison has been viewed primarily as a means, or technique, to be 
employed in the service of law reform, in the proper application of for-
eign law by the courts, in the international harmonization or unification 
of private law, and the like. Although it need not necessarily do so, this 
orientation has contributed to an emphasis on studying those legal or-
ders reasonably proximate in levels of development and sophistica-
tion . . . . 174 
To Butler, postwar politics meant that CIL would have to engage in far 
broader socio-legal comparisons, going beyond realist functionalism to 
encompass a number of related fields.175 Butler called this a form of 
“know thine enemy syndrome . . . the need to comprehend the basic phi-
losophical, historical, sociological, and political premises of a foreign 
legal system.”176 Accordingly, purpose driven CIL meant going beyond 
‘hard’ comparisons between, say, American and Soviet foreign affairs 
law. CIL study had to embrace the ancillary fields of legal theory, cul-
ture, and profession in the respective states.177 The key methodological 
challenge was identifying the purposive strategy—the why behind the 
comparative project—which would reveal what needed to be compared. 
Like the Ratner/Slaughter collection,178 International Law and the 
Comparative Method sought to present a menu of methodological ap-
proaches for studying how Soviets understood international law and, 
equally if not more important, how Soviets investigated the study of in-
ternational law in the West.179 The proper scope of CIL, in Butler’s opi-
nion, was not limited to one approach, but included, when appropriate, 
the study of the legal profession, legal language, the obstacles (real or 
anticipated) to municipal effectuation of international legal arrange-
ments,180 comparison of international legal histories, or how nations de-
veloped to have distinct approaches to given international institutions.181 
In sum, Butler emphasized the experimental and non-dogmatic nature of 
                                                                                                                                  
 174. Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12, at 26. 
 175. Id. at 29. 
 176. Id. at 31. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See generally Ratner & Slaughter, Method in the Message, supra note 4. 
 179. See Butler, International Law and the Comparative Method, supra note 12. 
 180. Id. at 34–35. 
 181. Id. at 36. 
2011] COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW 413 
comparison and embraced the overarching spirit of “hoped for broader 
cooperation, dialogue, and exchange.”182 
Set against pre-Cold War and immediate post-WWII geopolitical reali-
ties, Butler’s perspective on CIL was indeed forward thinking. Decoloni-
zation,183 the end of the Vietnam War (1975),184 the waning of détente 
against the USSR,185 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979)186 
made it vitally important to understand how other states intended to use 
existing international process to gain stronger positions in the global 
power race. Butler was completely right to reject the universal-
ism/absolutism of the interwar period—Gutteridge’s comparative style 
and Lauterpacht’s international sensibility—as “inadequate and obso-
lete.”187 He was also right to reject the righteous post-WWII policy-
oriented jurisprudence that sought to advance a personal conception of 
the good life against all others. In this sense, Butler’s approach to CIL 
was similar to Hazard’s in that it rejected the spinning of “fine theories,” 
or grand narratives, regarding the development of either Soviet or West-
ern international law doctrine. 
But in dismissing the earlier crude methodologies, Butler’s articulated 
replacement method was fraught with uneasy inner tensions. This is evi-
dent in several points. First, there is inevitable role conflict between But-
ler’s archetypal scholarly comparativist—the substantive knowledge 
seeker—and the pragmatic policy comparativist—who understands that 
“these matters . . . are of more than academic or historical concern”188 
and who has a duty to inform policy makers of what she knows about the 
foreign legal culture in question.189 Second, while Butler seems comfort-
able with the idea of regional or even continental approaches to interna-
tional law,190 he is also intimately conscious of the localized and cultural-
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ly contingent training process for would-be international lawyers.191 Yet, 
Butler is silent on how a would-be CIL scholar should divine regional 
trends from particularized sources (language, culture, history, etc.). 
International Law in Comparative Perspective was followed in the ear-
ly 1980s by yet another innovative project with significant ramifications 
for CIL. “In late 1983 a groundbreaking Protocol of Cooperation [“Di-
rect Link”] was concluded between the Faculty of Laws, University Col-
lege London . . . and the prestigious Institute of State and Law [“ISL”] of 
the USSR Academy of Sciences.”192 Together, Professor Vladimir N. 
Kudriavtsev (ISL) and Butler arranged for a series of symposia between 
representatives of the common law and socialist law traditions193 to take 
place in London and Moscow, with the hosting side paying the reasona-
ble conference costs.194 The cooperation agreement led to a series of aca-
demic visits over the next eight years and colloquia on a range of subs-
tantive topics.195 Naturally, the colloquia covered the topics of compara-
tive and international law and the status of these disciplines in the respec-
tive countries.196 Authors from both sides submitted concrete compara-
tive studies on substantive issues and offered thoughts on methodological 
questions confronting the two disciplines.197 
Different methodological approaches were also offered in Butler’s 
1990 edited work discussing the impact of perestroika on international 
law.198 The approaches can be loosely labeled as, inter alia, Soviet posi-
tivist/functionalist (G.I. Tunkin),199 Critical Legal Studies and literary 
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theory (J.A. Carty),200 systems analysis (D.I. Feldman), and a recurring 
policy-based methodology.201 Yet even in the collection of articles on 
perestroika and international law, the essays are divergent, and there is 
no consensus on what comparative method as applied to international 
law really means. By 1990, at least five different concepts, defined by 
their goals, were evoked to explain CIL: (1) comparison of various sys-
tems of international law in different historical epochs—the historicist 
goal, (2) identifying common values and general legal principles com-
mon to all people/nations—the universalist mission, (3) comparison of 
international organizations and institutions in their lawmaking or imple-
mentation aspects—the institutionalist goal, (4) drawing upon compara-
tive method in a Marxist framework to compare international legal rules 
in relation to different social or economic systems—the Marxist ap-
proach, and (5) to simply understand and classify different approaches to 
international law—the taxonomic approach.202 
It is immediately apparent that none of the above branches of CIL 
represent a comparative research or analytical methodology; rather, they 
represent an expanded or alternative domain for traditional comparative 
study.203 What, then, does a CIL methodology actually entail? What did 
CIL scholars actually need to do? 
Butler’s own suggestions can be found in his 1985 Hague Lectures on 
the topic of comparative approaches to international law.204 To Butler, 
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the project entailed nothing short of a grand meta-narrative that would 
include: 
The historical experience of a state in coming into being and in the pat-
terns and mode of diplomatic relations with others; its geopolitical 
frontiers; its cultural, political, economic and ancestral links with for-
eign entities; its sense of political, religious, or ideological mission; its 
capacity to exert military, economic, or political influence over other 
States either directly or through emulation and inspiration; its tech-
niques of formulating and executing foreign policy; together with its 
political, administrative, economic and legal institutions, concepts of 
law and methods of legal reasoning and discourse are all components, 
amongst others, of a national style in international law; . . . a compara-
tive perspective [is] essential.205 
To comparativists, the above list evokes Zweigert & Kötz’s famous in-
vocation of Rabel, demanding that future comparativist compare all poss-
ible factors affecting the law.206 But how does one make sense of these 
factors and influences? Is there a rank, an order of importance, or method 
for including everything? 
Butler (like Hazard and Korovin before him) does not offer a concep-
tual flowchart or cascading guide for how to assess influences such as 
economic constraints versus legal culture or political versus historical 
influences.207 It may be impossible to rank these complex influences, or 
it may be contingent on a number of other factors; besides, each compa-
rativist would likely employ his own preferred rank. However, the actual 
methodology for CIL is precisely the hoped for “broader cooperation, 
dialogue, and exchange” that Butler advocated.208 As Butler wrote in the 
introduction to the first work product of the Direct Link between the 
UCL and ISL, 
[L]egal studies originating in bilateral symposia of the nature described 
here are a veritable genre of legal literature of their own, to be meas-
ured against the past, the tenor of the times, the constraints inherent in 
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the medium, and the possible unexploited possibilities of that medium. 
Direct links hold out the promise of collaborative or sustained legal re-
search over an extended period of time, if required. . . . It remains for 
the parties concerned to make the most of the opportunity.209 
Put another way, what Butler and his counterparts at the ISL orchestrated 
in their Direct Links was CIL. Or to rephrase it in anthropological terms, 
by meeting his Soviet counterparts, Butler was building an expert ethno-
graphy210 of Soviet international lawyers and, by extension, gaining a 
clearer appreciation for the broadly conceived complexities of Soviet 
approaches to international law. As noted legal anthropologist Laura 
Nader would argue, Butler’s immersion worked partly because he was 
not borrowing “decontextualized and dehydrated” research methodolo-
gies,211 but rather embarking on a good faith encounter that simply hap-
pened to work.212 Like Korovin and Hazard before him, Butler was liv-
ing out the method213 of CIL by going beyond his encyclopedic know-
ledge of Soviet doctrine, going beyond the positive law, in favor of face-
to-face engagement, by hosting an earnest conversation or clash between 
the leading representatives of two apparently disparate systems. The full 
import (and Butler’s influence as chief choreographer) of this particular 
CIL project deserves greater study, but for the time being, this Article 
considers CIL in the post-Cold War context. 
C. Post-Cold War Fragmentation in Comparative Law & International 
Law 
The lessons to be drawn from the above biographical histories may 
seem intuitive, perhaps even banal. Indeed, the moral thus far is rather 
general—we should realize that different ‘systems’ (nations, states, 
peoples, cultures, etc.) view things differently, and we should approach 
the study of these differences with an open mind. But, the deeper claim is 
that contemporary CIL has much to learn from the first generation of CIL 
in the Cold War era. So, why is it important to situate the current revival 
of CIL against the larger backdrop of the Cold War (and interwar) theo-
retical debates? Why has the emerging CIL discipline chosen to overlook 
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twentieth century CIL projects involving Soviet approaches? This is 
doubly confusing when viewed in light of the recent revival of Marxist 
approaches to international law.214 How can Marxists neglect non-
Pashukanian Soviet approaches, and why do leading critical voices con-
done this ignorance? Are these strategic choices, ways to avoid appear-
ing orthodox or pro-Soviet?215 Or is a deeper ambivalence towards the 
Soviet legacy at play? 
Because answers to the latter questions (concerning why crits and 
Marxists avoid engaging with Soviet Approaches to International Law 
(“SAIL”) would dwell on the speculative at this stage), those questions 
are left for a later date. But to explore the central claim of this Article—
that, for good or bad, Soviet approaches continue to matter—it is impor-
tant to briefly survey the state of international law in the post-Cold War 
era and to highlight several perennial challenges, starting with the imme-
diate post-1989 era. 
Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, a 
number of scholars (in the West and the Soviet bloc) anticipated the radi-
cal impact perestroika would have on international law.216 Without delv-
ing too far into the literature, it is sufficient to point out the most signifi-
cant development—namely, the Soviet concession and willingness to 
ascribe to a monist, unitary international legal order.217 This took the 
form of multiple changes, including the removal of objections to com-
pulsory International Court of Justice jurisdiction under six international 
human rights agreements,218 attempts to establish direct links with a 
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number of international economic organizations,219 and the incorporation 
of international legal standards—general principles of international 
law—into domestic legislation as normative and substantive justifica-
tions for reform.220 
The West interpreted these sweeping reforms as the end to internation-
al law and institutions serving as ideological battlegrounds.221 Around 
the early 1990s, many shared a sincere hope that the United Nations 
(“UN”) would finally evolve into what its framers had hoped—the con-
science of the world and a forum for the peaceful resolution of interna-
tional disputes.222 For example, at the UN Security Council, the Soviet 
cooperation with the U.S. over Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait223 was seen as 
ushering in a new era of international security cooperation.224 With the 
ideological confrontation in the past, G.I. Tunkin enthusiastically praised 
perestroika for renewing faith in hope, progress, and most importantly, 
reason as the universal basis for a universal international law.225 With the 
final collapse of the USSR226 and Russia’s peaceful withdrawal of troops 
from the majority of former Soviet republics (with the exception of small 
‘peacekeeping’ contingents in territories like Moldova, Ukraine, and sev-
eral other states),227 it certainly seemed plausible that international law 
was entering a new epoch. 
Faith in neo-Kantian Reason as the basis for a perpetual peace did not 
last long, however. By the late 1990s, with NATO’s bombing raids in the 
former Yugoslavia,228 a string of attacks directed against the U.S. and 
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other states,229 and the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Central Asia, Eu-
rope, Africa, and elsewhere,230 the world suddenly seemed far more 
chaotic, bloody, and lawless than ten years prior. With the start of the 
Bush presidency, phrases like “new world order,” “American exceptio-
nalism,” “lawless world,” and “collapse of multilateralism” echoed the 
broader sentiment that international law was again in crisis.231 Thus, one 
of the enduring challenges for post-Cold War international law has been 
the inability to develop a working multilateral framework for ensuring 
global security. 
A second crisis in international law, broadly speaking, was bound up in 
the “human rights boom” of the 1990s and 2000s. These debates can be 
found in the contestations over the creation of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda, and International Criminal Court;232 the fiery debates over uni-
versal jurisdiction;233 jus cogens norms;234 and doctrinal wars over the 
application of legal categories like “war crimes,” genocide, and “crimes 
against humanity” to what we can all agree was mass murder around the 
world.235 
Third, over the past twenty years, international law was maturing into a 
highly complex patchwork of new separate sub-fields of international 
law in practice—from international environmental law, to international 
criminal law, to international economic law (itself further fractionalized 
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into various subspecialties)—alongside conventional categories like in-
ternational humanitarian law.236 The academic discipline of international 
law evolved symbiotically with these developments in public and private 
international law,237 even providing the impetus for, and generating, sev-
eral sub-fields.238 This process of substantive fragmentation went hand in 
hand with institutional fragmentation, theoretical disaggregation, and 
growing tolerance for political pluralism.239 Some have even described 
this as a split between American and European approaches to interna-
tional law, the split itself now amenable to CIL analysis.240 
These three conflicts—unilateralism vs. multilateralism, particularism 
vs. universalism in human rights discourse, and fragmentation—are but 
three main faultlines, of many. But the main commonality between the 
three is the systematic exclusion of a number of global stakeholders, ac-
tors, voices, or more simply, communities in the overall international law 
agenda. The disconnect between the wishes of acting global elites and 
the hordes of anti-war and environmental rights protesters is palpable.241 
The principal anxiety of non-governing elites is that international law is 
rapidly mushrooming somewhere in Geneva, New York, Brussels, or the 
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Hague, but without their knowledge or participation and in a routine way 
that has become almost mechanical.242 There are no venues for political 
contestation, and thus, international law just is; as it is made, so it con-
tinues to exist. 
Herein lay at least four answers to why contemporary CIL must be si-
tuated against the Cold War international law debates. First, at their theo-
retical core, the Cold War debates were about political participation, re-
distributive outcomes of trade regimes, and rights to unique forms of 
economic development, religious, and cultural pluralism.243 Decoloniza-
tion and national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s were a 
direct result of these theoretical debates. Second, and perhaps more im-
portantly, these debates had a concrete procedural/participatory aspect. 
Decolonization was not simply about national liberation; it was also 
about acquiring a seat at the UN General Assembly, about participating 
in the debates, about acquiring possible international law making pow-
ers.244 Similarly, in the interwar period, the participatory debate centered 
on the role of the League of Nations as either a nest for imperialist 
hawks,245 or as a venue for the dynamic expansion of the international 
community.246 
Of course, the Cold War international law debates were also about tra-
ditional spheres of influence, re-colonization, dependency theories, and 
new forms of economic and military protectorates for the newly inde-
pendent states.247 Empowering decolonized states and giving them a 
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voice at the UN General Assembly was acceptable so long as it did not 
dilute the power of the UN Security Council members.248 So the call to 
return to twentieth century theoretical debates should not be seen as a 
return to the actual political or intellectual postures of that time. But 
there is something vital and inspiring about how the twentieth century 
was pregnant with substantive and structural alternatives to the dominant 
post-WWII international legal order. 
Third, these debates on procedural aspects had corollary substantive 
components. How decisions were made at the UN related directly to the 
question of what decisions would be considered, which related directly to 
the functions of international law. Who is international law for? What is 
the correct balance between free trade and local labor laws? What is the 
best way to regulate the movement of capital, goods, and labor? Why do 
we need to restrict the power of states or multinational corporations? 
These are the questions the Cold War was ostensibly fought over, good 
questions to which there are still no satisfactory answers. The past twenty 
years also produced new challenges, such as how to define the values of 
intergenerational equity and biosphere preservation in non-
anthropocentric terms; and the proper balance between the threats posed 
by global terrorist networks, traditional doctrines of criminal liability, 
and evolving standards of international criminal law. 
CIL should seek to address these challenges by reference to different 
national, ethnic, religious, and historical approaches to international law 
and governance. Unfortunately, doing so is not as simple as opening a 
foreign international law textbook and searching for different approach-
es.249 While humans share certain uniting traits and universal aspirations, 
and different tribes of humans answer the above questions in radically 
different ways, where the answers are located is not at all evident. CIL 
can unlock where and how we find at least some answers to these ques-
tions. 
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Fourth, it is a geo-political fact that China has emerged as a new su-
perpower.250 It has its own deep history, traditions, languages, and 
unique approach to international law. The lessons of Cold War CIL are 
directly relevant to our understanding of this new reality. The USSR and 
China share remarkable similarities: they are self-proclaimed socialist 
states, with unitary political hierarchies and centralized academic organi-
zations (especially at the highest echelons and in fields like international 
law). New analysts approaching China’s international law doctrine are 
likely to be encumbered by similar misconceptions to those felt by an 
earlier generation of Sovietologists—‘background’ notions about a hy-
per-politicized judiciary or academy (the familiar refrain of ‘telephone 
justice’ or ‘telephone doctrine’), rampant, across-the-board abuse of hu-
man rights, a covert imperial agenda, and so on. By situating our ap-
proaches to Chinese international law against the earlier experience with 
Soviet international law, lessons can be teased out that may help to dif-
fuse the alarmist tendencies now gaining steam.251 
Traditional comparative law has much to offer on how to deal with 
these four contemporary challenges. Indeed, scholars have already 
started down this path.252 At the centennial summit in New Orleans in 
2000, for instance, Mathias Reimann wrote of the need for comparative 
law to take on transnational issues, including global and regional trade 
organizations, the EU, and similar bodies.253 In the ensuing ten years, to 
be fair, comparativists did not rush to engage with what Reimann called 
‘vertical comparisons.’254 This likely had less to do with a lack of me-
                                                                                                                                  
 250. “After three decades of spectacular growth, China passed Japan in the second 
quarter to become the world’s second-largest economy . . . . The milestone . . . is the most 
striking evidence yet that China’s ascendance is for real and that the rest of the world will 
have to reckon with a new economic superpower.” David Barboza, China Passes Japan 
as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at B1. 
 251. See id.; see also discussion infra Section III. 
 252. Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 816, 831 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW] (“The diversity 
of the Critical Legal Studies network’s constituency and the current collapse of discipli-
nary boundaries have made it clear that we need to rethink the relationship between com-
parative and international law—incidentally a view widely shared by scholars outside the 
network as well.”) [hereinafter Mattei, Critical Legal Studies]. 
 253. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law in the Interna-
tional Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103 (2001). For a more recent rendition of Reimann’s claim, 
see Reza Dibadj, Panglossian Transnationalism, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 256–59 
(2008). 
 254. These themes were picked up and elaborated in law and society circles in Europe 
and elsewhere. See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept 
of Law, 21 RATIO JURIS 1, 3 (2008) (describing the ongoing process of global legal plura-
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thodological tools or familiarity with international law and institutions, 
as with a general feeling of inertia. It is safe to say that the discipline of 
comparative law in the U.S. during the Bush era was dispirited and dis-
organized.255 What purpose was there, for instance, to study the tradi-
tional justice systems of Iraq or Afghanistan if the American leaders 
openly spoke of imposing democratization and modernization reforms? 
Whether as a result of the 2008 presidential election in the U.S., or a 
constellation of other reasons, many in the discipline are optimistic 
again. The publication in 2009 of the seventh edition of Schlesinger’s 
Comparative Law furthers the diversification of the traditional civ-
il/common law divide by introducing a much broader horizontal scope of 
inquiry.256 The new casebook also embraces Reimann’s call for ‘vertical 
comparisons,’ though it stops short of mixing international and compara-
tive law for pedagogical reasons.257 Additionally, one positive result of 
the global financial crisis and its aftermath is the more aggressive pursuit 
of global harmonization by comparative lawyers. Ralf Michaels recently 
wrote of the need for comparative lawyers to take on the World Bank’s 
linear and grossly deficient Doing Business project.258 One of America’s 
leading comparative lawyers and legal anthropologists, Annelise Riles, 
organized a large conference to explore ‘techniques of hope’ in the 
broadest sense.259 And in 2009, the International University College of 
Turin led a collaborative project on global legal standards which had, as 
                                                                                                                                  
lization as the multiplication of international institutions, norms and dispute resolution 
processes, but without a “single discursive arena in which legal reasoning takes place”). 
 255. This statement is based on the self-reflection of the authors, rather than an as-
sessment of others’ work. Furthermore, even in the discipline’s dejected periods, it is not 
correct to claim that “it [is] hard to find much well-done comparative-law work.” 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 351. Though Kennedy credits the Com-
mon Core project, of which the authors are a part, he overlooks the dramatic cumulative 
growth of smaller-scale substantive comparative law projects, and the exciting growth of 
comparative law outside of the US/Europe. These projects expanded from 2000–2008 as 
well, so the above periodization (following U.S. presidential election cycles) should only 
be seen as facilitating the telling of this story, not literally implying causation. 
 256. SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 26. 
 257. Id. at 8–13; see also Reimann, supra note 253, at 1116–17. 
 258. See Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing 
Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 
765, 765 (2009). 
 259. See Conference, Techniques of Hope: How Professionals and Professionalism 
Can Stabilize the Markets and Change the World, CORNELL LAW SCH. (Mar. 26, 2009), 
http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/international/clarke_program/conferences/Hope-as-
Technique.cfm; see also Annelise Riles, Is the Law Hopeful? (Cornell Law Sch., Work-
ing Papers Series, 2010), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1070&context=clsops_pap
ers (forthcoming in HOPE IN THE ECONOMY (H. Miyazaki and R. Swedberg eds., 2010)). 
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its aim, to suggest alternative models of development inspired by tradi-
tions and concerns of the global political, geographic, and economic “pe-
riphery.”260 
International law is also converging on this path. Led by David Kenne-
dy and his newstream, critical international law theorists are again asking 
the difficult questions: why do law and development projects go south 
(geographically, metaphorically, pejoratively)?; what is the role of global 
elites in turning a blind eye to the world’s dispossessed states and 
peoples?; what can international lawyers do to break the familiar intellec-
tual cycles of crisis/progress, center/periphery, ‘us’ vs. ‘them?’261 In a 
related stream of inquiry, a group of international lawyers calling itself 
TWAIL, led by Antony Anghie and B.S. Chimni, also seeks to revive a 
number of long-ignored interests, not just from the Global South, but 
also the interests of repressed indigenous groups in the Global North.262 
TWAIL is concerned principally with questions of imperialism, neo-
imperialism, and modern continuities of longstanding patterns of exploi-
tation.263 Bridging these two groups is an emerging third stream, roughly 
called national traditions in international law, which seeks to explore par-
ticular national or pre-national traditions or outlooks on international 
law. The next Section surveys these efforts in the context of the emerg-
ing field of CIL and asks what lessons CIL can draw from these diverse, 
yet interrelated, streams. 
                                                                                                                                  
 260. INT’L UNIV. COLLEGE OF TURIN GLOBAL LEGAL STANDARDS RESEARCH GROUP, 
IUC INDEPENDENT POLICY REPORT: AT THE END OF THE END OF HISTORY—GLOBAL 
LEGAL STANDARDS: PART OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM (Global Jurist vol. 
9 2009) (collectively written by IUC Global Legal Standards Research Group including 
this Article’s authors). 
 261. Newstream, also known as NAIL (“new approaches to international law”) is a 
broad term used to describe non-traditional approaches to international law, especially as 
pertains to the history of the development of international law and its institutions. See 
David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1 
(1989) [hereinafter Kennedy, New Stream]; see also Deborah Z. Cass, Navigating the 
Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 341, 
342–45 (1996). 
 262. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 6–12 (2005) [hereinafter ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM]; see also 
BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003) (critiquing from a historical and 
interdisciplinary approach, international law from the perspective of Third World move-
ments). 
 263. See ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, supra note 262, at 6–12. 
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II. PITFALLS: WHAT CAN COMPARATIVE LAW & INTERNATIONAL LAW 
LEARN FROM EACH OTHER? 
A. Mapping the Field 
At this point, it is necessary to take a step back and define several 
broad terms and categories used above and in the remainder of the Ar-
ticle. There is no longer any question that different nations conceptualize 
and interpret international norms differently. As referenced above, the 
existence of national yearbooks of international law, national associa-
tions of international law, and national international law journals, may 
evidence, at the very least, a desire to stake out a ‘national doctrinal iden-
tity’ or offer a space for the publication of scholarship arising from the 
territorial boundaries of a given state that may not ‘rise’ to the standards 
of ‘elite’ international law publications.264 National yearbooks also serve 
the functional purpose of documenting a given state’s treaty practice, 
national case law concerning international law questions, and related 
notes.265 Furthermore, many national international law yearbooks and 
journals also publish in the local language, which provides an important 
outlet outside the English-language dominated ‘elite’ international law 
journals.266 
At its most basic level, CIL simply entails the textual comparison of 
different doctrinal positions on a given international law topic. As an 
example, to get a good idea of how scholars in Canada and scholars in 
Russia interpret maritime obligations and boundaries in the Arctic, it is 
fair to turn to the Canadian and Russian yearbooks/journals of interna-
tional law, respectively. Presumably, the texts need to be translated into a 
common language before an individual can compare the similarities and 
differences of the scholars’ positions. Of course, this form of analysis is 
identical to the age-old process of treaty interpretation or discourse anal-
ysis and represents the very essence of what legal attachés do on a daily 
basis. Thus, though this is clearly a comparison between different na-
tions’ laws, such work falls within the discipline of international law as 
opposed to CIL. Similarly, the process of ascertaining general principles 
of international law, though also CIL in the strict sense, does not fall 
within a new conception of CIL. 
Rather, this Article is concerned with the abuse of, and suspicious of 
the ambiguity in, terms such as ‘Anglo-American tradition of interna-
                                                                                                                                  
 264. See infra text accompanying notes 338–42; see also Mattei, Critical Legal Stu-
dies, supra note 252, at 833. 
 265. Jan Stepan & Frank C. Chapman, National and Regional Yearbooks of Interna-
tional Law and Relations: A Brief Survey, 8 INT’L J.L. LIBR. 19, 19 (1980). 
 266. Id. at 20. 
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tional law,’ Nigerian approaches to international law, Third World ap-
proaches to international law, Indian approaches, etc., as well as terms 
used in the brief historical overview above, such as “general international 
law,” the West, “socialist international law,” “Soviet international law,” 
etc. 
1. Why (and is it Possible to) Study Different Traditions in International 
Law? 
At first blush, national approaches or ‘national traditions’ in interna-
tional law appears to be a tautological misnomer. If it is international 
law, it is meant to be law between nations, and presumably the nation at 
issue is a constituent part of that law. For this reason, international law 
scholars have constantly sought to clarify the term or to discard it alto-
gether, with suggestions like “transnational law,”267 “global” or “world” 
law,268 or “global governance.”269 Insofar as the term is fixed in the 
field’s popular and professional imaginations, it simply must be dealt 
with. However, there has never been a clearly defined sense of what it 
means to have a national approach to international law. 
For instance, it has always been exceedingly difficult to say whether 
America has a national tradition in international law. To illustrate, who 
in the American legal academy could summarize the main tenets of the 
American approach to international law? Even assuming such a brave 
step were taken, for every such enunciation by, say, Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter or W. Michael Reisman, one could point to a countervailing summa-
tion by, say, Jack Goldsmith or David Kennedy.270 The point is, within 
the American society of international law scholars, there are a sufficient 
                                                                                                                                  
 267. See, e.g., PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). 
 268. See, e.g., Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the 
Process of Globalization, 14 INT’L J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119 (2007) (exploring the 
notion of global law, its creation, and its role as a field of study); Lawrence S. Finkels-
tein, What is Global Governance, 1 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 367 (1995). 
 269. For an overview of this progression and a modern restatement of the global law 
thesis, see, e.g., RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW 53–117 (2010). 
 270. Compare Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 1997, at 183 (suggesting that a network of interconnected but distinctly nation-
al departments do and should define current international law rather than international 
legal norms that override national legal precedent); W. Michael Reisman, Old Wine in 
New Bottles: The Reagan and Brezhnev Doctrines in Contemporary International Law 
and Practice, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 171 (1988) (opining that international norms of non-
intervention are preferable to unilateral actions by powerful nations); Jack Goldsmith, 
Should International Human Rights Law Trump US Domestic Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
327 (2000) (concluding that international human rights law should not preempt domestic 
law); Kennedy, New Stream, supra note 261 (describing international institutions and 
international law as doctrinal rather than sources of normative laws and rights). 
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number of diametrically opposed positions that it becomes impossible to 
brand one position dominant or orthodox.271 Even in moments of relative 
accord within any given academic circle in either international law or 
comparative law, basic concepts can remain indeterminate or ambiguous, 
or can be usurped. For example, the adoption of the term “Bush doctrine” 
to refer to the right to use force preemptively when faced with a threat or 
risk of threat,272 was disparaged by those inside the last administration 
because the term quickly grew to signify anything from ‘the war on ter-
ror,’ to waterboarding, to good-old imperialism.273 
Furthermore, doctrinal positions are dynamic and change rather quick-
ly. They seem to routinely adapt to new political needs, economic chal-
lenges, and personal preferences or animosities. Thus, assuming it was 
possible to chart out the doctrinal positions of the twenty leading Ameri-
can international lawyers at time A, several weeks or months later, the 
matrix will not hold. 
In response to the temptation to observe national legal systems as 
wholes, or what Riles calls “legal corporeology,”274 comparative lawyers 
learned a long time ago that they need to narrow the scope of their 
study.275 Yet even with narrowed approaches, issues of terminology, 
translation, and expertise will continue to trouble the field.276 As ex-
plained above, the first generation of CIL scholars (Korovin, Hazard, 
Butler) intuitively sought to limit the scope of their respective inquiries, 
                                                                                                                                  
 271. Compare Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 4 (1990), with Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law—20 Years Later, 
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 7 (2009) (examining the changing role of politics in international 
law). For a similar point, see R. A. Mullerson, Sources of International Law: New Ten-
dencies in Soviet Thinking, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 494 (1989) (“During a joint Soviet-
British seminar on international law in the spring of 1988, [incidentally, organized by 
W.E. Butler], Professor Ian Brownlie said that it is not possible to speak of a British doc-
trine of international law because there are too many different points of view, even dif-
ferent schools.”); cf. C. J. Warbrick, The Theory of International Law: Is There an Eng-
lish Contribution?, in PERESTROIKA, supra note 44, at 41 (suggesting the existence of a 
unique English contribution to international law). 
 272. Joel R. Paul, The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking Customary International 
Law, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 457, 457 (2004). 
 273. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The ‘Bush Doctrine’: Can Preventive War Be 
Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 843 (2009) (discussing the continuing disputes 
over the normative, strategic, and legal wisdom of what has been called the “Bush Doc-
trine”). 
 274. Riles, Encountering Amateurism, supra note 27, at 118. 
 275. Id. (discussing the need to avoid panaromic views of legal systems). 
 276. See, e.g., Hungdah Chiu, The Development of Chinese International Law Terms 
and the Problem of Their Translation into English, 27 J. ASIAN STUD. 485, 485–86 
(1968). 
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but even so, the problem of legal corporeology was a persistent hurdle. 
Unless one attacked the global legal web from a rigorously Marxist ma-
terialist framework—at which point CIL is useless except to show shades 
of gradation, or how inequitable one state’s view of the global order is 
versus another’s—socialist and Western legal families were sufficiently 
variegated such that discussion of Soviet or ‘bourgeois’ international law 
had to be heavily qualified or contextualized in an effort to avoid devolv-
ing to overbroad clichés of either one or the other.277 
Several examples help highlight the contingent nature of statehood and 
other international political identities, such as regional groups, and iden-
tity-based groups or movements. 
a. The Myths of Regional Laws & Asian Approaches 
As mentioned above, over the past decades, scholars associated with 
the TWAIL movement have begun reviving the idea of regional ap-
proaches to international law and global governance. B.S. Chimni has 
gone so far as to claim that “the Asian approach to international law has 
in its core been articulated by TWAIL.”278 The idea of a collective 
‘Asian’ approach to public international law or human rights,279 and dis-
tinct Asian-state approaches to international law was first popularized 
during the formal decolonization period of the 1960s and 1970s.280 Con-
temporary international law scholarship on the Asian-values debate can 
be historical (as in studies on ancient Indian conceptions of international 
law),281 or it may focus on religious commonalities between people in 
Asia (such as Frederick Tse-shyang Chen’s writings on the Confucian 
approach to world order and international law).282 More recently, the dis-
cussion on shared aspirations and common cultural values has been 
grounded in quasi-anthropological assertions about a deep Asian spiri-
                                                                                                                                  
 277. See MIÉVILLE, supra note 214, at 60 (“quickly . . . dispens[ing] with … the ‘offi-
cial’ theories of international law of the erstwhile Soviet Bloc”). 
 278. B.S. Chimni, Is There an Asian Approach to International Law, 14 ASIAN Y.B. 
INT’L L. 249, 264 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 279. See, e.g., Kausikan, supra note 249, at 146. 
 280. See, e.g., K.R.R. Sastry, Hinduism and International Law, 117 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 503 (1966) (assessing the principles of international law from a Hindu perspec-
tive). 
 281. Ved P. Nanda, International Law in Ancient Hindu India, in RELIGION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 51–57 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
 282. Frederick Tse-shyang Chen, The Confucian View of World Order, in RELIGION 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 281, at 27. 
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tualism, historical practice of non-violence, and inner respect for the en-
vironment.283 
These essentialized conceptions of ‘Asia’ or particular Asian nations 
are problematic for several reasons. The most obvious is geographic.284 
India offers the best example in this respect. The product of colonialism, 
India is a veritable jigsaw puzzle of mixed ethnicities, language groups, 
religious groups and class factions. As a political body, it is an amalga-
mation of former principalities, carved into sometimes arbitrary federal 
units,285 with a number of unresolved border disputes with China286 and 
Pakistan.287 Nonetheless, it is tempting to view it as a unitary state with 
an easily identifiable ‘Third World’ voice. But the notion of an Indian 
approach to international law, bracketed within a Third World approach, 
is not dissimilar from the way the Indian ‘brand’ is attached to a single 
style of music, dance, and cuisine in the West. These national brands, 
whether food or approaches to international law, are meaningless; just as 
south Indian cuisine is different from Guajarati cuisine, so too, is it diffi-
cult to categorize a single Indian approach to international law. 
Although prefatory remarks in “national approaches” literature often 
acknowledge the vast cultural and intellectual pluralism within a country 
[or region], the exclusion of these sub-national, sub-regional, or separat-
                                                                                                                                  
 283. See generally RODA MUSHKAT, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ASIAN 
VALUES: LEGAL NORMS AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES (2004) (examining the extent to 
which Asian cultural relativism influences interpretation of the norms of international 
environmental law and the application of these norms in the region). 
 284. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Where Is Asia? When Is Asia? Theorizing Comparative 
Law and International Law, 44 UC DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). For similar analy-
sis in the European context, see Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Reflections on the Necessity of Re-
gional Approaches to International Law Through the Prism of the European Example: 
Neither Yes nor No, Neither Black nor White, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 7–9 (2010). 
 285. Consider the case of Bengal, which was partitioned from the former British colo-
ny of India in 1905 pursuant to Lord Curzon’s order. The partition was annulled in 1911. 
Bengal was again partitioned in 1947 following India’s independence into two provinces, 
the predominantly Hindu West Bengal, and the predominantly Muslim East Bengal. 
From 1947 until 1971, East Bengal was a province of Pakistan pursuant to the Mountbat-
ten Plan and the India Independence Act of 1947. In 1971, East Bengal became Bangla-
desh following the Bangladesh Liberation War. See Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Carto-
graphies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Un-
ending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) 
(analyzing the historical strife that accompanies the demarcation of borders to create new 
sovereign nations); see also 14 BANGLADESH, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 718–
19 (15th ed. 2005). 
 286. See, e.g., Factbox—India, China Begin Talks on Border Dispute, REUTERS (Aug. 
7, 2009, 4:09 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/07/idUSDEL465372. 
 287. See Arundhati Roy, Kashmir’s Fruits of Discord, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/opinion/09roy.html?ref=kashmir. 
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ist voices from a supposedly empirical study has a dangerous conse-
quence: it validates one particular view as dominant to the exclusion of 
the other.288 The same problem inheres when we imagine ‘Chinese ap-
proaches to international law,’ except it is compounded by an already-
strong instinct to presuppose internal coherence and crystalline consis-
tency in international law doctrine that emanates from the mainland.289 
Just as the misplaced confidence in the ‘official’ Soviet position drowned 
out legitimate alternative positions, so in the context of China, the notion 
of a ‘Chinese approach to international law’ presupposes centrality of 
control over the means of intellectual production and doctrinal uniformi-
ty.290 In other words, by indulging in the fantasy of a singular Chinese 
take on international law, the voices of opposition movements within the 
mainstream or heterodox positions slightly off the beaten track are si-
lenced, paradoxically reinforcing the dominance of the presumed majori-
ty opinion. 
b. The Study of ‘Other’ Traditions in International Law & Comparative 
Law 
Critical streams in comparative and international law are, of course, 
aware of the exclusion of the Derridean ‘other’ within mainstream narra-
tives.291 Sometimes, the exclusion is the function of good faith ignor-
                                                                                                                                  
 288. Cf. Fabri, supra note 284, at 10. Fabri discusses the geographical and political 
inclusion/exclusion bias inherent in the formulation of a ‘European’ approach to interna-
tional law, but nonetheless suggests the possibility of an ambivalent dualistic European 
approach: 
However, a European approach necessarily competes with a plurality of rather 
diverse national approaches and it therefore presupposes the possibility of dis-
covering enough unity despite the diversity, or within the diversity, and pro-
gressing towards more unity. This is the internal aspect. But there also is an ex-
ternal aspect, and if we acknowledge the idea of a European approach, we must 
also acknowledge that the external aspect carries a certain number of specifici-
ties. In other words, a European approach is both what unifies and specifies, a 
duality which can easily lead to ambivalence. 
Id. 
 289. See, e.g., Jacques de Lisle, China’s Approach to International Law: A Historical 
Perspective, 94 AM SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 267, 268–71 (2000) (discussing the evolution 
of China’s approach to international law). 
 290. Id. at 275. 
 291. See the excellent collection of essays in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 
(Anne Orford ed., 2006) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS]. For a good 
introduction to legal deconstruction, more generally, see J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive 
Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743, 748–49 (1987). 
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ance.292 Scholars simply have not thought to ask (or do not have time to 
ask) what Moldavian jurists think of the Transdnestrian conflict, or what 
Somali jurists think of the concept of universal jurisdiction and the Inter-
national Criminal Court in the context of piracy. However, many times 
the exclusion is purposeful, a way to shield plunder, guilt, and legal lia-
bility.293 
Over the past ten years, figures associated with various critical streams 
in international and comparative law have started to expose longstanding 
regional legal groupings as utterly contingent and artificial.294 The trail-
blazing work in this respect is Jorge Esquirol’s project to uncover the 
‘myth of Latin American law.’295 In a series of influential articles, Esqui-
rol analyzes the work of Rene David to expose the contingency of re-
gional constructs and their appropriation by powerful agents.296 More 
trenchant attacks on the (f)utility of regional or identity-based interpreta-
tions of international law can be seen in the Asian values debate, which 
expose both the contingency of political and/or regional constructs and 
also raise the dual questions of identity and authority/authenticity.297 
Identity concerns the question of who is legitimately entitled to speak on 
behalf of a group or nation.298 Authority/authenticity, on the other hand, 
refers to the degree of legitimacy/credibility attached to a given “voice” 
by its audience.299 
                                                                                                                                  
 292. See Antony Anghie, On Critique and the Other, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS 
OTHERS, supra note 291, at 389. 
 293. See, e.g., UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS 
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 295. See Jorge Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
41, 42 (2003). For discussion of how Esquirol’s work helps to deconstruct broader re-
gional and national narratives, see David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 416 n.106. 
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 297. Ruskola, supra note 284, at 3. 
 298. See Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Legal Pluralism, Indigenous Law and the Special 
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a culture, ethnic group, or nation. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 276, at 485–86. On textual 
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An instructive illustration of the interwoven issues of identity and au-
thenticity can be in the persona of even the most mainstream internation-
al law scholars, such as Rosalyn Higgins, the former President of the In-
ternational Court of Justice from 2006 to 2009.300 For instance, discuss-
ing the issue of whether it is any more difficult for her to be critical in the 
Israel case concerning the construction of the wall in the Palestinian ter-
ritory301 because she is Jewish, Higgins flatly responded that she did not 
think so, stressing that she judged the case as an international lawyer and 
not with regard to her background. She explains, “I also think that the 
fact you happen to be Jewish doesn’t mean you think that everything the 
State of Israel does is right.”302 Yet when the UK Foreign Office put her 
name forward for election to the court, it should be remembered, there 
were fears that some countries in the UN would not vote for a Jewish 
woman. While Judge Higgins dismisses such concerns, saying “I don’t 
think I have ever been perceived as Rosalyn Higgins, the Jewish interna-
tional lawyer—and I hope not Rosalyn Higgins, the woman international 
lawyer,”303 how credible is this act of detachment in the eyes of her au-
dience? Conversely, if she had claimed to speak as a feminist ‘voice’ on 
international law, to what extent would this act pass muster? The takea-
way from this example—along with the myths of Latin American law, or 
Asian approaches to international law—is to beware of putative oracles 
speaking on behalf of a given international law tradition; to beware of 
                                                                                                                                  
thentic’ Marxist tradition). The authors expand on LaCapra’s dichotomy and use authen-
ticity in its everyday sense (fake vs. authentic) as well as the broader sense of ‘identity, 
propriety and authenticity’ which is established by reference to a pure opposite ‘other,’ in 
this case imperialist, Chinese, feminist, Third World, or indigenous orders. With respect 
to the former, authenticity is important for very practical reasons. In writing a compara-
tive legal history, a comparativist is not dealing with ‘international law’ but rather what is 
left of international law—the writings of jurists, old codes, constitutions, and textbooks. 
See Pierre Legrand, “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte:” Intimations of Jacques Derrida as 
Comparatist-at-Law, in DERRIDA AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 125 (Peter Goodrich, Florian 
Hoffman, Michel Rosenfeld, & Cornelia Vismann eds., 2008); Lorca, supra note 18, at 
479 n.6 (quoting Arnold McNair, Aspects of State Sovereignty, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 6, 
6 n.1 (1949) (noting that “most history of international law is either a history of its litera-
ture, or a history of international relations . . . . [and] [i]t is difficult to find much history 
of the content, that is, the actual rules of law as applied in practice”)). 
 300. The Court: President Rosalyn Higgins, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1&judge=6 (last visited Feb. 16, 2011). 
 301. For the advisory opinion in the case, see Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 
9). 
 302. Joshua Rosenberg, British Woman is World’s Most Senior Judge, THE TELEGRAPH 
(April 6, 2006), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1514961/British-woman-is-
worlds-most-senior-judge.html. 
 303. Id. 
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one’s own doctrinal views being mischaracterized as falling into a rival 
international law tradition; and lastly, to understand that group-based 
international legal theory taxonomies (including in some ways the 
present one) are by and large useless to the individuals who actually 
drive policy, manage exports and imports, or re-negotiate sovereign debt. 
Of course, these issues of identity and authority/authenticity are not 
new to comparative law. One of the great achievements of comparative 
law is that it has finally developed operational methodologies and tech-
niques to identify these issues and address them.304 Both are useful to 
break down what could be called “methodological path-dependence”—
the idea of the nation-state as the default and most-useful category for 
thinking about transnational social phenomena,305 including the discip-
line of international law.306 And as shown above, identity and authentici-
ty critiques also allow the demystification of the notion that given groups 
of scholars represent a particular minority,307 or other marginal voices.308 
Thus far, the critiques of regional or identity-based approaches to in-
ternational law suggest that the normative challenge for CIL scholars 
who want to do something with CIL aside from just classification is not 
to create an alternative perspective on international law, but rather to 
recognize a plurality of existing perspectives. Second, if the national plu-
ralism thesis is accepted, then the task of CIL becomes to articulate these 
                                                                                                                                  
 304. See, e.g., Mitchel de S.-O.-L’E. Lasser, The Question of Understanding, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 9, at 197, 205, 237. Lasser’s contributions, 
particularly with respect to the ‘official’/unofficial divide are extremely relevant to the 
deconstruction of complex texts (i.e., a 2008 Iranian international law treatise written by 
a figure with unclear ties to the ruling regime) and conflicting or compound identity-
based arguments. 
 305. Cotterrell calls it “methodological nationalism” but this terminology may be mis-
leading. See Cotterrell, supra note 254, at 4. 
 306. Id. at 4–5. 
 307. In this respect, see INTLAWGRRLS, http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2010), a blog co-authored by a number of influential female international law 
scholars, subtitled “voices on international law, policy and practice” and further subtitled 
“it’s our world, after all.” Id. The purpose of the blog seems to facilitate discussion and 
the dissemination of ideas. Diane Marie A Mann, IntLawGrrls’ Heartfelt Hello, 
INTLAWGRRLS (Feb. 10, 2007, 9:23 PM), 
http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2007/02/intlawgirls-heartfelt-hello.html (“Women now 
have a hand in our world’s affairs: think Albright and Arbour, del Ponte and Higgins, 
Ginsburg and Rice. Yet our voices remain faint, in backrooms and in the blogosphere. 
IntLawGrrls—women who teach and work in international law, policy and practice—
hope to change all that. We embrace foremothers’ names to encourage crisp commentary, 
delivered at times with a dash of sass.”). To what extent blogs such as this purposefully 
include or exclude certain other groups, or can be said to represent an identity-based 
ideological or political agenda, is altogether unclear. 
 308. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS, supra note 291. 
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myriad national perspectives on international law. But here a problem 
presents itself. The deconstruction of the nation state as a coherent intel-
lectual model logically facilitates the further deconstruction and plurali-
zation of the nation-state’s constituent communities, whether they are 
ethnic, geographic, or class-based.309 But, if all of these categories, too, 
are contingent and potentially unstable, then all that is left are the writ-
ings of particular jurists, or at most, networks of scholars working in 
common intellectual affinity with one another. Should the task of CIL be 
limited to studying the differences between these theoretical schools, or 
confederations of scholars? The answer, perhaps, is yes, but with impor-
tant methodological nuances. 
2. CIL as the Study of Norm Diffusion? 
With the difficulty of identifying the subject of study (states, national 
groups, etc.), perhaps it is better for CIL to focus on the object (the actual 
norms in question), focusing its inquiry on the processes of norm diffu-
sion across jurisdictions.310 First, is it possible to study the process of 
transplantation of entire “theories” or models of international law from 
one state to another? This question is closely related to the question of 
the appropriate scope of CIL inquiry that was addressed above.311 
Second, is there still value to be gained from studying broad patterns of 
norm diffusion, transplants, and receptions? In brief, the answer to both 
questions is yes. There is great value to understanding how legal trans-
plants transcend geographical, linguistic, and political boundaries and 
penetrate seemingly foreign terrains.312 This can be done by analyzing 
the transmission agents, whether legal education reforms, direct imposi-
tion (like World Bank structural adjustment policies), or internalized per-
                                                                                                                                  
 309. Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1457 (1992). 
 310. See generally LARRY CATA BACKER, HARMONIZATION LAW IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION (2007) (highlighting interactions between different systems and illustrat-
ing the way different relationships produce different effects across the world); DAVID B. 
GOLDMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION: RECURRING PATTERNS 
OF LAW AND Authority 12–34 (2007); William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global 
Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 5–7 (2004); Michael Likosky, 
Cultural Imperialism in the Context of Transnational Commercial Collaboration, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 221, 222–26 (Michael Likosky ed., 2002). 
 311. See supra text accompanying notes 174–82. 
 312. See Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Recep-
tions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 252, at 441, 442–43. 
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ceptions of “lack” (of a robust legal system) by the local legal elites in a 
given state.313 
However, moving from the local to the global, from micro- to macro-
level comparisons is seemingly counterintuitive. At the very least, it goes 
against the grain of developments in comparative law over the past two 
decades that have moved into more sophisticated models of micro-level 
transplants and techniques of monitoring localized reception.314 On the 
other hand, there is no theoretical hurdle to comparing such macro con-
cepts as “international legal theory” or “approaches to governance.” It is 
theoretically possible to do functional micro-comparison315 of a macro-
concept like “public international law.”316 So long as there is no pretense 
about capturing universal truths,317 macro-comparisons of social pheno-
mena like the appropriation of foreign theoretical constructs may actually 
be useful. In fact, recent CIL scholarship—such as Arnulf Becker Lor-
ca’s comparative study of the notion of universality in European and pe-
ripheral international law—explicitly rests on a functionalist method.318 
The transplantation of vague notions like “international law” or “rule 
of law” is also important because they often act as theoretical lodestars 
towards which subsequent micro-level reforms are geared.319 Thus, in the 
                                                                                                                                  
 313. See Laura Nader, Law and the Theory of Lack, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 191, 193 (2005). 
 314. Often, this has been practiced by scholars employing law and economics analysis 
in a transnational setting. See, e.g., Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 147 (2008) (identifying original approaches to legal research); see also 
Mathias M. Siems, Legal Origins: Reconciling Law & Finance and Comparative Law, 52 
MCGILL L.J. 55, 78–81 (2007); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of 
Corporate Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (using econometrics to study particular events); William B. 
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law to Promote Democratic Policy: 
The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 703 (2005). 
 315. Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 252, at 339, 341; see also ZWEIGERT & 
KÖTZ, supra note 206, at 4–5 (discussing micro versus macro comparisons). 
 316. Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES, 
supra note 9, at 110 (arguing that subjects as large as ‘law’ or ‘religion’ can be investi-
gated in functional terms). 
 317. Id. at 112. 
 318. Lorca, supra note 18, at 483 (“Section three explores the diversity of legal re-
gimes in the three aforementioned ideal types and argues that the functional equivalences 
between them explain a common pattern of appropriation in the semi-periphery.”) (em-
phasis added). 
 319. Far from being an academic exercise, studying the diffusion of vague notions 
carries significant foreign policy overtones. Consider Attorney General Eric Holder’s 
recent claim that “the rule of law is one of the United States’ greatest exports.” Written 
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context of traditional legal transplant studies, CIL projects can facilitate a 
keener understanding of vertically-imposed reasons for particular domes-
tic reforms.320 Where nations feel compelled to reform domestic legal 
orders to bring them into line with global legal standards, CIL can shed 
light on the process of norm diffusion in these contexts. 
As with CIL projects focusing on national approaches or identity-based 
approaches, CIL projects analyzing norm diffusion also run the risk of 
amateurism and corporeology. Additionally, both types of CIL projects 
can be attacked on the basis of false objectivity, the notion that the CIL 
project itself is not merely an intellectual quest for knowledge or under-
standing, but carries a particular political agenda.321 Even if scholars are 
careful to assume the political dimension of their comparative project 
and bring the assumption to the fore,322 essentially offering a disclaimer 
of their political/ideological commitments, there is always an implicit 
undisclosed cultural and ideological bias that comes with the comparativ-
ist.323 Likewise, the idea that CIL can offer some sort of non-
contextualized truth, or a method of perceiving truth about competing 
approaches to international law, vastly misconstrues the capacity and 
function of the comparative endeavor. 
B. Methodological Minima for CIL 
Having answered the core methodological question—whether it is val-
uable to speak of CIL as a disciplinary bridge between comparative me-
                                                                                                                                  
Testimony by Eric Holder, Attorney General, to U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2009/ag-
testimony-0911181.html. 
 320. See, e.g., Mamlyuk, Legal Harmonization, supra note 88 (describing how the 
post-Soviet transformation to monism in Russian international legal theory necessitated 
vertical and horizontal legal harmonization reforms in the IP sector). 
 321. See George Winterton, Comparative Law Teaching, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 69, 80–81 
(1975). 
 322. See David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES, supra note 9, at 345. “[C]omparatists are sensitive to ‘accusations’ that their 
work might have anything one could regard as a politics. To my ears, their sensitivity on 
this point can seem so extreme that it is hard to think of it as fully ingenuous.” Id. at 349. 
Kennedy goes on to probe the ideological heart of comparative law by deconstructing the 
discipline’s history. For an earlier position on comparative law and hegemony, see Ugo 
Mattei, Some Realism About Comparativism: Comparative Law Teaching in the Hege-
monic Jurisdiction, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 87 (2002). For an example of the self-
congratulation and claim of objectivity at issue, see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 206, 
at 3 (“[B]y the international exchanges which it requires, comparative law procures the 
gradual approximation of viewpoints, the abandonment of deadly complacency, and the 
relaxation of fixed dogma.”). 
 323. See Winterton, supra note 321, at 81. 
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thod and international law—this Article proceeds with an outline of what 
can be called methodological minima and maxima. As a heuristic, the 
table below offers one way to conceptualize the functional unit (or range) 
perhaps most appropriate for CIL analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Diagram of Comparative International Law? 
The idea here is that existing methods already inhabit the wide range of 
what would ordinarily fall into the sweeping category of CIL, were such 
a discipline to take hold. With respect to positive law, comparative law 
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and public/private international law probably already provides the tech-
niques necessary to account for differences across jurisdictions. At this 
upper extreme, there is also a conceptual limit to CIL study, which is the 
notion of regional approaches, such as European approaches to interna-
tional law, Asian approaches to international law, or North American 
approaches to international law. 
The lower limit in CIL inquiry is an individual’s writings on interna-
tional law and particular schools of international law. If the work of two 
or more scholars shares sufficient similarity, it becomes possible to 
group it within a larger ‘project’ or ‘tradition,’ and so forth. For this rea-
son, monikers like the Vienna Circle, Frankfurt School, New Haven ap-
proach, Trento/Torino Common Core, Harvard CLS, or the Toronto 
Group, have a more or less reliable, or at least familiar, referent. Scholars 
who become affiliated with these and similar projects share a profession-
al network, may share general political sensibilities, and at the very least, 
meet with one another and cite each other’s work.324 
But between these two extremes lies a gulf of contested territory. Mov-
ing from the top down, the next possible field is CIL as the study of simi-
larities and difference between two (or more) national approaches to in-
ternational law and institutions. But even the most basic and familiar cat-
egories in international law—the nation-states—blur at close range.325 
Adding the temporal dimension, the dynamic evolution of norms and 
doctrinal positions across a relatively short time span, shows that at-
tempts to capture group narratives are but a single frame in a moving 
picture of interpretations (the views of several leading jurists), with the 
plot changing mid-frame to reflect political or substantive priorities.326 
Moreover, as discussed above, there is nothing inherently different about 
comparing how two given foreign ministries react to the introduction of a 
new international norm from the traditional functionalist method used in 
drawing comparisons about domestic legal orders.327 
The next possible candidate for CIL study is a comparison of domestic 
processes and structures of making decisions about international law and 
international relations. This can be done by reference to cases, treatises, 
and other materials that explain how a given policy position is devel-
oped. In a way, this form of CIL amounts to a variant of McDougal’s 
                                                                                                                                  
 324. Mattei, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 252, at 829. 
 325. Continuing with David Kennedy’s metaphor. See David Kennedy, New Ap-
proaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 
UTAH L. REV. 545, 550–54 (1997) (discussing the international lawyer’s perspective and 
view on subject through metaphor of Aunt Betty, Uncle Chuck, and their photographer). 
 326. See id. 
 327. See supra Section II.A. 
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processual jurisprudence, an attempt to capture how decisions are made 
within the respective country’s foreign policy apparatus.328 This form of 
CIL presupposes, however, that a systemic account of these myriad as-
pects of social reality is possible; or, alternatively, that scholars could 
agree on the proper methodological basis for such an empirical study. If 
McDougal’s “disciplined and contextual” policy analysis329 ultimately 
failed to offer a predictive capacity for understanding one state’s actions 
under international law, it is hardly an appropriate analytical or descrip-
tive methodology for comparison among multiple actors.330 
This leads to the space between the opinions of individual international 
law scholars and international law processes, or the domain of doctrinal 
schools and ‘soft’ international law institutions.331 In the Authors’ view, 
this is the most proper domain for CIL inquiry for at least three reasons. 
First, this is the proper domain by basis of exclusion: traditional public 
international law and comparative law already occupy the discursive 
space for discussing similarities and differences in positive law across 
jurisdictions. Traditional discourse analysis already exists to analyze the 
similarities and divergences between individual doctrinal positions.332 
However, there is little work on comparison of institutional projects in 
international law—or the comparison of the coordinated output of legal 
research institutes, legal centers, and funded research projects.333 
To make the abstract more concrete, a perfect example of an institu-
tional project currently afoot that is in dire need of the type of CIL analy-
                                                                                                                                  
 328. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power & Policy: A Contempo-
rary Conception, 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157 (1953). 
 329. Myres S. McDougal, Perspective for an International Law of Human Dignity, 53 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 107, 109–10 (1959). 
 330. Harold Koh’s New Legal Process School is the contemporary intellectual incarna-
tion of this policy analysis jurisprudence. New Legal Process is distinguished from the 
earlier school principally by its narrower scope of inquiry. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, 
New International Legal Process, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 335 (1999). 
 331. The term “‘soft’ international law institutions” is used here to refer generally to 
legal actors, which encompasses networks of scholars, law school research centers, legal 
think tanks, but also what is conventionally thought of as actual legal actors in the inter-
national arena, such as diplomats. 
 332. Cf. John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Devel-
oping East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 657 (2008) (theorizing and employing 
discourse analysis as a methodology for analyzing legal transplants as “conversations” 
between different states’ regulatory regimes). 
 333. See, e.g., Fabri, supra note 284, at 3 (“[T]he question of the necessity for a Euro-
pean approach to international law is political in the sense that it is necessarily connected 
to a project. Giving an answer thus equates to siding with or against the project, more or 
less consciously and with more or less nuances. However, I do not believe this should be 
voiced within this article.”) (emphasis added). 
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sis envisioned here is the work of the Asian Society of International Law, 
and its most recent project, the Asian Journal of International Law 
(“Asian Journal”).334 More specifically, what is the historical signific-
ance of the publication of the first issue of the new publication in January 
2011? Perhaps it exemplifies the assertion of Asia overcoming the West 
in economic and even intellectual terms? Is there a commonality of polit-
ical outlooks among the editors? Does this move signify a new theoreti-
cal posture or the emergence of a new network, coalition, or cluster of 
scholars with a shared scholarly agenda? Why is the journal being pub-
lished by Cambridge University Press, and why is it limited to English 
language contributions, as a practical convenience—“rather than political 
endorsement”—as the editors assert, or perhaps to ensure the highest le-
vels of scholarship through the ‘double-blind peer-review’ process?335 
Presumably, a legal journal is founded to fill a theoretical or structural 
void left by pre-existing publication fora, to publish work not being ac-
cepted elsewhere, that may be too controversial or non-topical, of a high-
er or lesser caliber than that published elsewhere, or as a challenge to 
existing frameworks. In remembering the Soviet interwar experience, it 
should be recalled that Pashukanis founded the Communist Academy 
and the legal journal Revolution in Law (Revoliutsiia Prava) as a direct 
challenge to not only the heir of the Imperial-era Russian Academy of 
Sciences (which became the Soviet Institute of State and Law) but also 
as a way to undermine the work of Korovin’s Journal of Soviet Law (So-
vetskoe Pravo). This was not only a political posture; it was as much an 
expression of theoretical opposition as of institutional rivalry for political 
favor and research funding. Similarly, Hazard’s choice of Columbia 
University was not merely a personal convenience, it represented an in-
stitutional choice with significant consequences—the opportunity to es-
tablish a Russian legal studies center336 and to attract research funding 
from individuals and institutions in an intensely charged political cli-
mate.337 Similarly, it is possible that Butler’s choice of London for the 
                                                                                                                                  
 334. See 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1 (2011), 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=AJL (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) 
[hereinafter ASIAN J. INT’L L.]. 
 335. Instructions for Contributors, ASIAN J. INT’L L. (Aug. 27, 2010), 
http://journals.cambridge.org/images/fileUpload/documents/ajl_ifc.pdf. 
 336. The institute that Hazard was involved with was the Russia Institute at Columbia, 
since renamed the Harriman Institute. It was founded in 1946 with support from the 
Rockefeller Foundation. See History, HARRIMAN INST., 
http://www.harrimaninstitute.org/about/history.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). 
 337. To recall the investigations by the House Un-American Activities Committee, see 
supra text accompanying note 146. 
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home of the Vinogradoff Institute338 also reflected strategic considera-
tions—a more or less neutral ground on which to develop the Direct 
Link—rather than mere chance. Perhaps the alternative, setting up the 
‘Link’ directly between the U.S. and Moscow, would have been seen in 
the early 1980s as a quasi-official bilateral move not only by the respec-
tive parties, but also by outside observers. Alternating research confe-
rences between Moscow and London may have been more palatable to 
both the Soviet and Western scholars, freeing them to engage intellec-
tually with one another. 
Accordingly, while at first blush the question of the Asian Journal may 
appear esoteric, upon closer examination, it is indicative of an important 
institutional development in international law. Taking the stated purpose 
of the new Asian Journal at its word, the focus of the journal is intended 
to cover ‘Asian’ approaches in a broad fashion: 
The regional focus of the Journal is broadly conceived. Some articles 
may focus specifically on Asian issues; others will bring one of the 
many Asian perspectives to bear on issues of global concern. Still oth-
ers will be of more general interest to scholars, practitioners, and poli-
cymakers located in or working on Asia.339 
Yet browsing through the list of eminent contributors to the inaugural 
issue, one is struck by both the Western-centered nature of the contribu-
tions, and the Western origins or the authors.340 Reflecting on the earlier 
discussion regarding the oft-stated goals of new legal research networks 
or new journals—as the intellectual homes of alternative frameworks, or 
as venues for the publication of otherwise unconventional scholarship—
it is highly unlikely that the contributions of Koskenniemi, Farer, or 
Charlesworth could not find voice in any of the usual elite publication 
channels.341 Instead, considering the sum of the outward indicia—the 
                                                                                                                                  
 338. See W.E. Butler, On the Origins of International Legal Science in Russia: The 
Role of P. P. Shafirov, 4 J. HIST. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2002). 
 339. See ASIAN J. INT’L L., supra note 334. 
 340. Id. Only two out of the eight contributors can be said to be scholars, practitioners, 
or policymakers located in or working on Asia. 
 341. Id. Without speculating on the actual reasons for the inclusion of these highly 
esteemed international law publicists in the inaugural issue of the Asian Journal versus 
other scholars, it seems somewhat strange that a majority of the invited articles had prac-
tically nothing to do with the ostensible main purpose of the Asian Journal, which is to 
represent Asian approaches to international law. An Asian Journal of International Law, 
1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2011) (“The Asian Journal of International Law aspires to culti-
vate a conversation between scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers located in or in-
terested in Asia.”). 
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theme of the Tokyo conference establishing the journal,342 the dissemina-
tion of the call for submissions to Ivy League U.S. law schools and top-
flight European schools, the caliber of contributors to the inaugural issue, 
the publication venue—one gets the sense that the Asian Society of In-
ternational Law is seeking to replicate the success of the European Socie-
ty of International Law, to project relevance to the outside world, to dec-
lare that “we too, matter!” Regardless of the merits or likely success of 
such an endeavor, it represents a concerted effort by a group of scholars 
who already have significant personal intellectual cachet, and who have 
now sought to give voice to a particular thought through collective ac-
tion. 
CIL, if it is to have any relevance and recognized disciplinary space, 
can offer a sophisticated and empirically grounded analysis of these and 
related historical phenomena. Of course, scholars can take an active and 
creative approach by organizing these respective conferences, journals, 
networks, and think tanks. Yet, whether the actual research methodology 
adopted is professional immersion,343 collaboration, and/or institutional 
convergence,344 the goal of the individual should be to expose the politi-
cal agenda of the given network. Additionally, if the scholar is the crea-
tive agent, the goal should be to set a common agenda, to force partici-
pants to make the tragic choices of being in or out, of being part of the 
presumed (and hopefully expressly identified) problem, or being part of 
the (hopefully expressly and programmatically identified) solution. 
What should be clear, the CIL method being proposed here is not a 
systematic, objective driven encounter. It is empirical in the sense of col-
lecting institutional data derived from institutional records, systematic 
surveys, semi-structured interviews, and ethnographic-style observation. 
But it is subjective prima facie, with the express goal not of collecting 
samples, per se, but of building political linkages between international 
lawyers. It is a knowledge quest, yes, but more importantly, it is an exer-
cise in building political participation. For, by promoting academic ex-
change and research collaboration, the goal is collaboration and partici-
pation in and of itself. The CIL scholar is unable to transcend her own 
                                                                                                                                  
 342. See Tokyo Conference 2009, ASIAN SOC’Y INT’L LAW, 
http://law.nus.edu.sg/asiansil/conference/tokyo2009.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (The 
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cultural habitus and immerse herself entirely in the mindset of the for-
eign internationalist. And that is not the point. The point is twofold: first, 
to develop working relationships and common projects with the foreign 
internationalist camp; second, to get a basic understanding of that foreign 
mindset to be able to present it to one’s students.345 
III. METHODS: CIL AS STUDY OF COMPETING METHODS? 
As an alternative to the comparative analysis of ‘soft’ international law 
actors and institutions discussed above, CIL is also accurately described 
as the study of competing comparative methods. For instance, CIL can 
entail the study of the impact of Soviet comparative law in the making of 
Western comparative law. Though a full study is outside of the scope of 
the present Article, this Section introduces the cross-fertilization between 
Soviet and Western comparative law in spite of the strident claims of 
incomparability by Soviet bloc comparativists.346 The Section closes 
with a discussion on the uses of CIL scholarship and anticipated relev-
ance for those outside of academic circles. 
John Quigley’s book on the positive influence of Soviet legal theory on 
the development of global international law and the Western domestic 
legal order is a good example of the farthest to which Western scholars 
acknowledge the influence of Soviet law outside of the socialist bloc.347 
Quigley’s central claim is that “[d]espite its rejection of Soviet concepts, 
the West absorbed many of them,” offering examples ranging from 
women’s suffrage rights, women’s rights in family law, decolonization, 
and a host of other positively perceived historical developments.348 A 
logical outgrowth of Quigley’s central thesis is that by rejecting Soviet 
exceptionalism and charging the Soviet Union with nihilism, Western 
international law learned the effectiveness and utility of exceptionalist 
rhetoric. 
It should be noted that a comparative law tradition as a distinct discip-
line did not exist in Soviet jurisprudence.349 From the inception of Soviet 
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legal theory in the 1920s, there was an ambivalent relationship with the 
comparative legal method.350 On the one hand, comparison was indis-
pensable to understand the peculiar features of the bourgeois states so as 
to analyze and heighten the contrast between the Soviet Union and the 
West.351 Comparative law, for instance, was included in the lesson plans 
for law faculties, though it was not taught as a separate course to stu-
dents.352 John N. Hazard’s lecture notes from courses at Moscow’s Jurid-
ical Institute indicate that descriptive contrastive comparison to bour-
geois practice was common in practically every course.353 
On the other hand, comparison was seen as superfluous to international 
law due to the objective/universal nature of historical rules.354 It was log-
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ically unnecessary to have a comparative law discipline since the com-
peting bourgeois systems would inevitably self-destroy and become his-
torical relics.355 For this reason, comparative law scholarship declined in 
the Soviet Union from the mid-1930s.356 Following WWII, when Ger-
man émigrés brought comparative law to U.S. law schools357 and com-
parative law became a distinct (though troubled) discipline, interest in 
comparative law in Soviet scholarship was not as pronounced as in the 
West. To illustrate, Soviet scholars Iu. Ia. Baskin and D.I. Feldman, in 
their 1980 essay on Comparative Legal Research and International Law, 
cite Szabo’s 1969 article on comparative law and the 1967 Soviet trans-
lation of René David’s Major Legal Systems of the World as the extent of 
Soviet literature on the subject.358 
More recent research reveals that a distinct Soviet comparative law 
style emerged in the 1960s as a result of attempts by Uzbek jurists to ap-
ply a comparative method to legal systems of the fifteen Soviet republics. 
It was a harmonization project similar to the Common Core project,359 
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but markedly different in that it began from the assumption of harmo-
nized legal systems and sought to identify divergent streams.360 Accord-
ing to Butler, comparative law began to take on a disciplinary character 
(similar to that in the West) in the mid-1980s, led by the contributions of 
the Uzbek scholars.361 
Curiously, a review of Soviet literature reveals a lack of a functionalist 
or fact based comparative methodology for studying the bourgeois inter-
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national law tradition, aside from pure oppositions derived from Soviet 
historical-materialism method. The only comparative method per se was 
Marxist-Leninist dialectics, which supposedly gave a model for contrast-
ing different state and legal systems.362 In a way, historical dialectics can 
be compared to the method of comparative legal history, but the methods 
are different in a basic way: Marxist historical dialectics was a historical-
ly determinist method,363 whereas traditional comparative legal history 
was avowedly anti-determinist.364 This is one reason, for instance, why 
historical materialism—while providing an excellent framework for de-
constructing Soviet/Russian international legal history and for framing a 
comprehensive legal history—fails to answer normative or prescriptive 
questions.365 
The Soviet comparative law of the 1980s was not a big improvement 
over the prior comparison-by-contrast method. Soviet literature resorted 
to familiar clichés about bourgeois law: “bourgeois comparativists do not 
conceal the fact that the principal aim of comparative jurisprudence con-
sists of spreading the legal systems of the different capitalist states eve-
rywhere.”366 However, Western comparative law was the one discipline 
where the critique was completely inapposite during Soviet times. West-
ern comparativists like Hazard, Berman, and Butler spent entire careers 
trying to understand and compare the Soviet system to other systems in 
the spirit of cooperation, mutual understanding, and rapprochement.367 
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To the extent they critiqued Soviet law, their critiques were wholly legi-
timate. One could hardly say (other than in the utmost abstract sense) 
that they were involved in a grand comparative imperial project.368 The 
major contribution of a Marxist critique of ‘bourgeois’ comparative law 
was that “bourgeois comparativists . . . contrast only the forms of legal 
phenomena, paying no attention to essential social bonds, and subse-
quently carry over the conclusions derived to essential relations.”369 The 
essential relations, of course, referred to the legal form, the fundamental 
nature and function of law, both domestic and international. But other 
than raising the critique, the late Soviet jurists did not explore it further 
so as not to undermine the then-reached compromise of permanent 
peaceful coexistence or reopen the theoretical debates of the interwar 
period. The Soviet CIL method was left to comparing the qualitatively 
different nature of Soviet treaties with fellow socialist states,370 divining 
general principles of law for ICJ Article 38,371 comparing domestic im-
plementation regimes,372 and studying the work of international institu-
tions. Still, the method was invoked and practiced until the demise of the 
USSR. 
CONCLUSION 
CIL cannot be reduced to a set of fundamental unifying legal prin-
ciples, methodological approaches, or disciplinary aspirations. Rather, 
just as the dominant characteristic of comparative law has been (by and 
large) by ad hoc muddling through, or sampling of, how different legal 
cultures solve difficult legal problems, so has much of international law 
scholarship looking at national or regional traditions been of a diffuse 
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character.373 But this apparent and likely doctrinal incoherence does not 
mean that CIL must lack a conceptual or political core. 
Since its birth at the dawn of modernity, international law has always 
been presented as a discipline with an open universalistic vocation. Be-
cause of this flavor it has been contrasted with comparative law, a discip-
line that, to the contrary, rejects any form of universalism, being in the 
core business of locating and analyzing differences. Coherently with 
these intellectual premises, the system of international law, being a uni-
versal edifice claiming a global scope, cannot be compared with any oth-
er system for the simple reason of the lack of alternatives. 
Today, these modern assumptions are questioned. On the one hand, we 
now know that comparative law alternates between “contrastive” phases, 
with emphasis on differences, and “integrative” phases, with emphasis 
on analogies. During the integrative phases, claims of universalism are 
not absent in this discipline. On the other hand, in recent years, because 
of the emphasis of the role of interpreters in the making of the law, the 
assumed universalism in international law has been questioned by a va-
riety of new approaches to international law. In this view, international 
law is not the same as interpreted in the core and in the periphery, in 
Western and non-Western countries, in dominant or in resistant settings. 
Hence it becomes possible to compare one vision of international law 
with another vision, and such an effort claims its own academic identity 
as one of the comparative disciplines, namely comparative international 
law. 
In this new vision not only it is likely that the two disciplines may ben-
efit from each other, but also that a dialogue between the two can pro-
duce important results in terms of overall legal civilization. Indeed, today 
there is more than one radically alternative approach to international law; 
approaches that consider the current international legal edifice as hope-
lessly flawed, a hypocritical cover up of a relationship of power that is 
entirely characterized by the law of the stronger. Such approaches be-
lieve that a different international legal order, genuinely alternative to the 
status quo and based on democracy and respect, is not only highly desir-
able but also necessary in a global political system that is conducting the 
world to the final catastrophe.374 This alternative vision, much less 
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grounded in State entities and much more on global people’s movements, 
itself makes a global critical claim and consequently finds it very diffi-
cult to coexist intellectually with the current status quo based on the rhe-
toric of the rule of law.375 
This Article sought to contribute to the understanding of the current 
clash of radically alternative views about the international legal order and 
to contribute in the first steps of the newborn discipline of comparative 
international law by telling the story of a time in which not only a com-
pletely alternative narrative of international law was available, but also in 
which its own claim to universalism was credible and supported by a 
powerful legal economic political and military apparatus. In this story, 
Soviet international law and “capitalist international law” found a way to 
coexist in a turbulent political environment. This is a story of responsibil-
ity of a global scholarly community that has contributed with the force of 
reason to overcome, at least in part, the reasons of force. The birth of 
comparative international law, or at least its first significant archeologi-
cal layer, must be located in this story and must be fully appreciated to 
make sense of the development of a line of inquiry and of scholarly ac-
tion called “comparative international law.” 
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